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Abstract 
This paper presents a strategic analysis of the distribution model in the hearth industry for 
Regency Fireplace Products (Regency).  The paper researches the business environment for Regency in 
North America, determines its competitive position in the industry and develops strategies for competitive 
advantage and steady growth. 
An industry analysis is conducted to determine the key success factors for incumbents that 
compete in the industry.  Competitors are compared to explore the opportunities and threats for Regency’s 
distribution model within the highly competitive hearth industry.  The strengths and weaknesses of 
Regency are analyzed, and the strategic position of Regency is presented to identify the strategic 
alternatives.   
Several criteria are established to evaluate the strategic alternatives based on the environment; 
management preferences, organization and resources.  An alternative assessment and internal analysis are 
conducted to determine the strategy for Regency.  In closing, a final recommendation and action plan is 
outlined for Regency taking into consideration the organizations change management culture. 
The final recommendation for Regency is for them to develop a franchise of retail hearth stores 
across North America.  This strategic alternative will exploit the core competencies of Regency and allow 
them to maintain their differentiation strategy and gain competitive advantage in the hearth industry. 
 
Keywords:  Hearth Industry; Distribution; Forward Integration 
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1: INTRODUCTION 
 This introductory chapter outlines the purpose and scope of this project and 
provides an overview of the hearth industry.  The focus firm, Regency Fireplace Products 
(Regency) will be introduced along with its current business strategies in North America.  
 
1.1    Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the distribution systems within the hearth 
industry.  Regency will be studied to develop strategic alternatives to current strategy 
problems at the distribution and retail level of their value chain. 
The problem stems from Regency having insufficient control over the complete 
selling process of their products in the North American market.  This analysis will outline 
an understanding of the current distribution systems and explain how they currently 
portray a high level of imitation in the industry.   Moreover, the following analysis will 
develop an understanding of the necessities, complexities and limitations with these 
systems.  The analysis continues to explore further opportunities as a need for change to 
gain competitive advantage within the hearth industry.     
These opportunities in the form of strategic alternatives will look at “vertical 
integration” models in the retail sector.  It is important to note that Regency’s 
performance at the distribution and retail level remains steady; however market 
indications show that their strategy is strained and due for change of an anticipatory 
nature (Crossan et al., 2009).   
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This strategic analysis will look into existing and future cost models and identify 
where improvements and unnecessary infrastructure and support can be removed from 
the value chain.  In making these vertical integration opportunities reality, the 
organizational structure of Regency will be analyzed in terms of feasibility of achieving 
the strategic alternative(s) outlined.   The analysis will be conducted to include the high 
end hearth product segment including wood, gas and pellet products.  These primary 
products complement each other at the retail level and bring a component of product line 
for consumer choice.  Although differing consumer motivations to purchase these 
products exist, the majority of retail stores offer a variety of these product segments on 
their showroom floors. 
 
 
1.2    The Hearth Industry 
 The Hearth Industry generates U.S. $1.6 billion per year in revenue.  
Combine these sales with installations and this industry represents a U.S. $5 billion 
annual value.  In the U.S., nearly 1 million wood, gas and pellet hearth appliances were 
shipped in 2010; of those, over 650,000 were gas-fueled models.  In Canada, nearly 
150,000 hearth products were shipped in 2010. (HPBA, 2011) 
Figure 1.0 below shows the U.S. hearth industry appliance shipments from 1998 
through 2011 (HPBA, 2011).  Figure 1.1 below shows the Canadian hearth industry 
appliance shipments from 1999 through 2011 (HPBA, 2011). 
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Figure 1.0:  U.S. Hearth Industry Appliance Shipments 
 
 
Figure 1.1:  Canadian Hearth Industry Appliance Shipments 
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The hearth industry has matured over two decades of healthy growth.  Over 
this time, the industry has experienced cyclical ups and downs.   However in 2006, 
the industry in North America suffered a substantial downturn.  Concurrently, a 
market saturated with inventory, a heat wave that swept across the nation (Wikipedia, 
2012) and a slowdown in job growth, economic opportunity and residential housing 
starts (Weller, 2006) all contributed to this downturn.  Recovery within the hearth 
industry was delayed with the onset of The Great Recession of 2008-2009.  During 
this period, the industry experienced mergers and acquisitions, company re-
structuring and bankruptcies.  The majority of the key players in the industry 
continued with R&D and product development so as to position themselves for the 
economic recovery.  Now, heading into 2012, the industry has stabilized and 
strategies are aimed at lower inventories and “close to market” responsiveness.    
The hearth industry as a whole is heavily dependent on energy prices, 
consumer confidence and seasonal weather trends.  When energy prices are high, the 
weather is cold and consumers feel they have expendable money to spend on their 
homes, the industry and its incumbents prosper.  Figure 1.2 shows the effects of the 
industry and economic downturns on Regency’s production output.  
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Figure 1.2:  Regency Fireplace Products Production Levels: 2004-2011 
 
               (Source:  Regency Fireplace Products; Production Output Summary Data) 
 
Most North American homeowners have some understanding of what a fireplace 
is and typically associate it with heat, comfort and enjoyment of the flame.  But, there are 
many other attributes related to a fireplace product.  In fact the fireplace industry or the 
hearth industry as it is called is complex and loaded with consumer choice.  There still 
exists a lack of knowledge amongst consumers regarding the application and benefits of a 
hearth product.   Fireplaces, as they are most commonly called, come in many flavors of 
design, function, application, fuel type, use and price. 
The most notable beginnings of the hearth industry date back to the 1950’s 
through the 1960’s with the introduction of zero clearance open masonry wood 
fireplaces.  After the 1967 Oil Embargo and the subsequent 1973 Oil Crisis (Horton, n.d), 
wood burning heating products became a viable product for residential homeowners and 
hence a market was opened.  In the 1970’s, the introduction of wood stoves took hold and 
without government and environmental regulations to contend with, many entrants came 
6 
 
into the market.  By 1988, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had implemented 
regulations that govern the manufacture and sale of wood burning stoves and wood 
burning fireplace inserts.  The stringent regulations and high costs of testing and 
compliance forced many manufacturers to exit.  These existing incumbents were not 
structured, prepared or possessed the sufficient resources to stay in this newly regulated, 
yet evolving market.   
About the same time, gas fireplace products were gaining growth in a market 
where the homeowner preferred a cleaner and convenient method of heating their space 
without the mess and work of a wood stove.  In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of gas 
shortages and price irregularities indicated that a regulated market was not best for 
consumers or the natural gas industry.  Into the 1980s and early 1990s, the natural gas 
industry gradually moved toward less regulation, allowing for healthy competition and 
market-based prices.  These moves led to a strengthening of the natural gas market, 
lowering prices for consumers and allowing for a great deal more natural gas to be 
discovered (Natural Gas, 2010). 
As natural gas and propane gas became more available and cost effective for 
residential use, the gas fireplace market started to show substantial growth.  Again, 
regulations regarding safety (gas connections, temperatures, clearances) and efficiencies 
made entry costs high for new manufacturers.  Most of the firms that withstood the EPA 
regulations and developed certified wood burning products were now developing gas 
burning heating products.  Through the 1990’s, gas fireplaces, stoves and inserts started 
to become a larger percentage of revenue for hearth product manufacturers with the 
typical trends of 70-80% of the industry shipments being gas products. 
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The hearth industry has grown over the last 30 years and has become heavily 
fragmented and competitive.   There are standard high volume, “spec” home 
manufacturers, low volume specialty manufacturers and niche application manufacturers.  
However, a large percentage of the incumbents in the industry are diverse and have the 
expertise to be a threat, if they are not already, in any of these segments.  The industry 
incumbents manufacture and sell products throughout North America and other specific 
regions of the world.  Regional areas within North America offer differing product 
categories and hence competition among incumbents tends to be regional.  Product 
offerings are vast and structured around product lines and branding.  Products compete 
with each other on a basis of esthetics, design, function, size, application, price and 
geographic area.  Some products compete across their own product lines while others are 
developed to complement a line. 
Although firms within the industry may operate with different business strategies, 
their supply chain models have evolved to share many similarities at the industry level.  
In looking at the front end of the supply chain, the majority of the major players within 
the industry operate with common raw material suppliers and sources.  However, at the 
back end of the supply chain, incumbents distribute and sell their products through 
varying channels.  Some smaller firms choose to sell their “low end” products through 
large nationwide stores such as Home Depot or Lowes to take advantage of scale, but at a 
cost of margin.  Some firms develop contracts with local home builders and supply into 
the new housing market resulting in potentially higher volume business but yielding low 
margins.  Other firms, one of such being Regency Fireplace Products, design, 
manufacture, market and distribute their products into specialty dealers such as hearth, 
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patio, barbeque and spa stores.  Consumers coming into these stores are looking to 
upgrade, renovate, custom build a home or increase the number fireplaces in their home.    
The products going into specialty dealers and sold through to the consumer generate a 
greater willingness to pay over big box store products due to the additional value 
obtained from choice, functionality and superior design.  
The largest players in the industry have a developed a wide range of 
diversification and manufacture products for more than one segment.  These firms can 
benefit from scale and scope economies but are also exposed to specific downturns in 
economic conditions, specifically if a greater percentage of their business lies in any one 
affected segment (for example; supplying into the new home market and the 2008 
housing crisis in the U.S.).  The high end segment of the hearth industry is built on high 
quality and reliable products, progressive product development, efficient and focused 
distribution and substantial spend in marketing and customer support to obtain and retain 
the dealer networks.  As a successful firm in this high end segment of the hearth industry, 
Regency competes with many incumbents at varying degrees with respect to product 
offering, install application, regional consumer preferences and distribution strategies.   
 
1.3    Regency Fireplace Products Overview  
Regency Fireplace Products (Regency) began in 1979 in Richmond, B.C., 
Canada, with the founder, one employee and $10,000 in capital.  Then, the company was 
called Triumph Manufacturing and manufactured wood stoves under the Triumph name, 
which were sold in Western Canada and the Western United States.   Although the 
founder was a late entrant into the industry, he came in at the right time.  The wood stove 
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industry boomed in the early 1980's and the company prospered.  In 1984, the founder 
changed the company name to Regency Industries and started the process of developing 
the Regency® product line.  In 1988 the wood stove industry changed dramatically with 
the United States EPA legislation of smoke emission limits for wood stoves.  An 
estimated 90% of manufacturers closed their doors, but Regency’s technical expertise 
enabled the company to exceed the EPA standards and remain profitable.    
In the late 1980's Regency was also quick to recognize the shift in consumer 
attitudes and the growing demand for gas fireplaces.  In the 1990’s the company 
embarked on a number of strategic changes to deal with the growing demand.  First, the 
company diversified into the manufacturing of gas fireplaces.  Second, the company 
began to hire professional managers from larger organizations outside the hearth products 
industry. By 1993, new managers were running Operations, Sales, Marketing, Research 
& Development and Finance. These managers came from a variety of fields such as the 
aircraft industry, office products, and advertising and brought a diversity of knowledge 
and talent. 
Recognizing that lack of dedicated distribution focus with Regency’s growing 
product lines the company made a strategic change to own and operate a regional based 
distribution center network.  Prior to that strategic decision, third party distribution was 
being used through-out the industry and the needed focus and technical training required 
to maximize product distribution into the retail sector was lacking.   In 1995, Regency 
started this expansion and created their first regional branch of sales, service and 
warehouse in London, Ontario.  The year of 1996 was the start of a high growth period 
and many changes.   The company changed its name from Regency to FPI Fireplace 
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Products International Ltd. (FPI) to signal a growing international presence.   The second 
big change in 1996 was FPI’s move into its present head office building in Delta, BC.  
This state of the art 140,000 square foot building was custom built to house our 
manufacturing plant and research facility. This facility has grown to where it is presently 
at 200,000 square feet.  In March 1996 the first US regional facility in Edgewood, 
Maryland was opened.  Following this, a second regional facility was opened in June 
1996 in Sacramento, California.  In March 1998, a third branch outside Chicago was 
opened.   In January 1999, a long time sales agent in the state of Oregon became a full 
branch of FPI, covering the Pacific Northwest out of Portland.  In 2004, a facility in 
Newington, New Hampshire was opened and in January 2006, Regency opened its first 
branch outside of North America in Melbourne, Australia.   All of these facilities provide 
customers in each region with product distribution and technical, marketing and sales 
support.   
Also in 2006, Regency developed a joint venture in Shanghai, China for R&D and 
production of wood stove products for the Australian market.   Wood stove products in 
Australia are approved under the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as exempt, as 
opposed to the stricter North America regulations.  These products serve a different 
market in Australia and sell at lower price points.  The resulting simplicity of design 
allowed Regency to off-shore these products to yield lower costs in R&D, manufacture 
and freight 
In addition to the North American and Eastern Australian markets, Regency also 
exports products to Asia, New Zealand, West Australia, Latin America and Europe.   
Today, again known as Regency Fireplace Products (to re-gain brand awareness), the 
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largest market is in the USA, where products are sold through a strong network of 
distribution channels and specialty retailers.   Out of Regency’s fifteen hundred specialty 
retailers in North America, 90% are multi-competitor (MC) and 10% are Regency only 
product by choice.  It is important to note that Regency does not wholly own any part of 
its dealer network. 
Regency has grown as a key player in the high end hearth market with sales 
revenue of between CDN $55 million and $70 million over the last four years.  Market 
share in Canada and the U.S. is maintaining a marginal, yet steady growth (see Table 
1.0).  Regency manufactured, distributed and sold approximately 40,000 units in 2011.   
Regency’s employees comprise of 90 staff at head office and 70 throughout our 
distribution/sales branches and the company employs, on average, 200 unionized factory 
workers in a seasonal and cyclical environment.  Because of seasonality, Regency 
manufacturing does experience regular layoffs.  The unionized workforce typically 
ranges from 240 employees at peak to 160 employees at slow periods. 
Regency’s success is based on a blend of technical expertise, design aesthetics, 
outstanding product quality, well established distribution channels and excellent customer 
service.  They actively seek customers’ input into their product design and their quality 
products depend on the crucial role that customers and suppliers play in new product 
development process. 
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Table 1.0:  Market Share for Regency Fireplace Products (as of Q3, 2011)
 
(Source: HPBA: Hearth, Patio, Barbeque Association 2011 3rd Quarter Industry Results.  Results tabulated 
from sales data participation from 24 hearth industry manufacturers) 
 
1.3.1   The Regency Strategy  
Regency’s current differentiation strategy has been long standing and consistent 
over their 32 years in business.  As an industry leader, Regency has held a respected 
position as a high end hearth supplier that focuses primarily on the custom renovation 
market.  Regency’s competitive advantage with its MC dealer network is the capability 
and attention given to superior customer service.   Regency’s service in terms of dealer 
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support, through their specialized sales force, is recognized as the best in the industry and 
allows them to enhance their exposure at the dealer level.  
As a major player in the hearth industry, Regency continues to be financially 
successful with a low to mid range production volume and a high margin business model 
in comparison to its key competitors.  Some competitors in the same market and dealer 
network have more of a cost-based strategy based on attractive product discounts and 
payment terms to the dealer because they don’t have the same capability to provide the 
service levels of Regency.  This competitor strategy lends itself to a higher volume yet a 
lower margin business model.    This is not how Regency wants to compete.    
 The Regency strategy is based on the lowest volume, highest quality product with 
the best customer service for the highest margin.   As the industry incumbents operate 
between a differentiation and cost based strategy, Regency remains loyal to their 
differentiation strategy through their exceptional product quality and customer service.  
This customer service consists of sales training and support, technical training and 
support and technical after-sale service.  As well, Regency’s consistent presence at fairs 
and home shows facilitates bringing consumers to dealers through customer education.  
However, once the consumer is in the MC dealer showroom, the dealer may sell them a 
competitive product. 
The following Table 1.1, Ed Bukszar’s Strategic Grid Fit, works to look for the 
consistency between capabilities and strategy and to identify potential problems related to 
implementing a strategy. 
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Table 1.1:  Strategic Fit Grid for Regency Fireplace Products 
 Cost Based 
 
          Differentiation 
 Low Cost, 
Adequate Quality 
          High Quality, 
Adequate Cost 
             
 
 
Source 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Product 
Strategy 
 
Rapid 
Follower 
   X       Innovative 
R&D 
Expenses 
 
Low       X    High 
Structure 
 
Centralized       X    Decentralized 
Decision 
Making 
 
Less 
Autonomy 
        X  Autonomy 
Production,  
Service 
 
Economies of 
Scale 
        X  Economies of 
Scope, Flexible 
Labor 
 
Mass 
Production 
        X  Highly Skilled, 
Flexible 
 
Marketing 
 
Comparative,  
Push 
      X    Pioneering, 
Pull 
 
Risk Profile 
 
Low Risk  X         High Risk 
Capital 
Structure 
 
Leveraged 
(Debt) 
        X  Conservative 
(Equity) 
(Source:  Strategic Fit Grid; Dr. Ed Bukszar, Associate Professor, SFU Beedie School of Business) 
 
As is seen from the strategic fit grid, Regency favors a differentiation strategy.  
However, a low risk profile and lack of innovation with product development has 
hampered Regency’s ability to fully exploit this differentiation strategy.  By the nature of 
the industry, innovation equals higher risk.   Regency has not wanted to risk the cost of 
innovation and has held steady, specifically over the last several years of economic 
uncertainty, with a lower risk profile in order to protect the financial position and 
profitability of the company. 
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The position of being a close follower in new product development is arguably a 
potential weakness for Regency from the point of view of overall product sell through.  
Moreover, when an incumbent is a first mover in launching a new product to market, they 
become price setters within what the market will bear.  As a close follower, Regency now 
has to face the challenge of keeping within a reasonable reach of this market price and/or 
justifying its higher price model.  However, selling the high quality benefits of a Regency 
product for this higher price is sometimes not the first priority of the MC dealer.   The 
question is; does Regency develop products for the dealer or the homeowner?  The 
answer is the homeowner, and Regency relies on the MC dealer to justify the benefits of 
its products to the homeowner.  
As competitors continue to develop a diverse scope of trendy and innovative 
products, the question remains; do these competitors capture their return on investment or 
are these trendy products just a means to sell their mainstream products?   In fact, hearth 
industry dealers are partial to innovative product in their showrooms for this very reason.   
Regency’s strengths exist in economies of scope with their production process 
and service.   Regency’s production process consistently produces industry leading 
product quality and their customer service is the benchmark of the industry.  The unique 
mix of being a privately held, conservative and equity based organization with a low risk 
profile has allowed Regency to remain in a financially healthy position through the last 
decade of industry and economic ups and downs.   
These strengths are the reason Regency has remained a presence in the high end 
hearth market.  Regency’s founder and executive continue to hold true to this long 
standing strategy and reputation in the hearth market.  However, competitors are focusing 
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on higher volume sell through the dealer network by means of cost-based strategies 
yielding lower margins.   These cost-based strategies are undermining what Regency is 
all about and without the superior sales and marketing presence at the dealer level, 
Regency would lose market share.   
As the market and its incumbents have evolved, Regency, recognizing the 
changing environment, needs to look at their own strategy from an anticipatory change 
(Crossan et al, 2009) point of view.  Regency’s financial performance and profitability 
remains stable; however growth targets, although higher than inflation, have been 
slowing in comparison to previous years.  This slowing trend should be a red flag of 
concern for Regency to look at going forward. 
 
1.3.2    The Regency Structure 
Regency has a hybrid structure of a professional bureaucracy in a divisionalized 
form (Wexler, 2011).   This is shown in how their sales and distribution branches are 
structured and positioned amongst their corporate office and manufacturing operations.   
Regency is a highly specialized organization with a fairly high level of autonomy in a 
decentralized environment.    
As most corporate decisions are made at head office, the sales and distribution 
branches maintain independent operations with autonomy to manage their branches as 
required to meet corporate objectives.   Each sales and distribution location maintains its 
own resources of technical service/training and sales force.  These regional resources 
service and support their respective dealer networks with marketing, training, events, 
home shows, sales incentives and industry leading product availability.  
17 
 
 
1.3.3   Problems with the Current Regency Strategy 
Regency’s success over their 32 years in business has been through a 
differentiation strategy.  The company is structured around and is committed to this 
strategy going forward.   However, the primary problem existing with Regency’s current 
strategy is in not having a focused and controlling share of the complete selling process 
from the source of supply, whether it be Regency’s distribution branches and/or 
manufacturing facility.  Regency does not control the selling process or the final sale 
influence of their products; the dealer does.  Within Regency’s network of fifteen 
hundred specialty dealers, 90% of them have a multi-competitor showroom.  The other 
10% are “Regency only dealers”, meaning these dealers own/lease their own store and 
choose to sell only Regency products.  Regency does not wholly own any part of the 
current dealer network. 
   A multi-competitor showroom consists of 3 or more competitive product lines.  
This multi-competitor environment is hampering Regency’s ability to sell its products 
based on a differentiation strategy because of the lack of cost-benefit knowledge given to 
the consumer from the dealer.  The consumer at this point looks at hearth products as 
commodities and the dealer sells on price if the consumer doesn’t understand value. 
This is where Regency’s differentiation strategy does not work so well.  The 
problem is the lack of [MC] dealer commitment specifically with Regency product; the 
MC dealer wins if they sell any product.   Moreover, Regency does not have a dedicated 
presence on the showroom floor and therefore the customer lacks necessary information.  
The MC dealer has the edge over Regency.  
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As Regency’s product is priced at the higher end, MC dealers may in fact play the 
Regency product off against a competitor’s lower cost product.  The MC dealer 
environment tends to function on a cost-based strategy as a whole and this in itself 
creates problems due to the high fixed costs associated with a differentiation strategy.  
Some competitors will conform to this environment opting for higher volume product 
sales at lower quality levels, deeper price discounts, larger spiffs and looser payment 
terms.  As the industry operates with similar high fixed costs, this structure yields lower 
margins.   
Regency makes great efforts to avoid this low margin structure through its 
differentiation of high quality products, superior customer service and a strong presence 
at dealer fairs and home shows.   Moreover, this cost-based industry strategy at the MC 
dealer level hand-cuffs Regency’s growth and margin targets in order for them to remain 
profitable.   
With an understanding of the dangers of a cost-based strategy, Regency strives to 
differentiate other components of their business model, whether through lean 
manufacturing systems, continuous product development, aggressive marketing programs 
and superior before and after sale service.  This is all in their objective to maintain a 
competitive advantage and build the Regency brand, protect reputation capital and gain 
market share. 
Most competitors search for differentiation within product design and strive to 
build brand awareness and exposure.  However, this is a limited objective due to the 
consumer’s conservative preference on design esthetics and a below average knowledge 
base regarding hearth products.   Most consumers have minimal experience with hearth 
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products and the complexities of applications and installations.  A consumer generally 
can be influenced to purchase what the retail dealer suggests.    
Retail pricing is generally comparable across all competitors’ products.  However, 
Regency positions itself at the mid to upper range.  When an incumbent acts as a first 
mover of differentiation in product design or functionality, competitors are quick to 
follow and imitate as close followers, including Regency.  The result is many similar 
products on the market.   
The main rivalry is on the dealer’s showroom floor due to the multi-competitor 
environment.  Showroom space is limited and the dealers’ influence on the consumer is 
substantial.  Dealers apply a lot of pressure on manufacturers for attractive price 
structures, discounts and marketing promotions.   MC dealers in the hearth industry will 
leverage or withhold relevant consumer information as a competitive edge in dealing with 
manufacturers.  These dynamics put strain on the differentiation strategy of Regency and 
allows substantial control of the selling process in the hands of the dealer.   
MC dealers will sell the product that creates the most profit for them.   The 
competitive battle and high cost to obtain a space in a dealer’s showroom does not mean 
that the dealer will sell your product.  Moreover, dealers may use the cost of the high end 
product to sell the lower end choices when a customer is unsure or a needed sale is 
required.  In the MC dealer environment, Regency only experiences, on average, 30% of 
a typical dealer’s sell through.  Yet, Regency outlays 100% of support, product training 
and market materials to these respective dealers.  This is a typical scenario across the 
industry and creates a vicious cycle of competition among the incumbents.  
20 
 
Regency’s current strategy suffers from a cost-benefit problem.  The high end 
hearth industry has currently reached a level where Regency is being pressured to operate 
in the direction of a cost-based strategy.  Moreover, Regency’s differentiation factors are 
not being effectively passed on from the dealers to the homeowner.  This is only offset by 
the extensive effort of Regency’s sales force obtaining and retaining new accounts and 
maintaining a high presence at regional fairs, home shows and events to ensure a 
Regency product will be sold.   These efforts are the driving factor behind dealers selling 
Regency product.  The competition takes another approach through substantial product 
discounts and less sales force presence, support and training.   
Regency understands in order to position itself for continued growth in the high 
end hearth industry a change is required to address the current problems with its MC 
dealer model.   This change is that of an anticipatory nature, as Regency’s performance 
has not seen a significant decline but yet their growth is seeing signs of slowing.    
Over the last several years, in light of the 2008 U.S. recession, the hearth industry 
has seen an overall decline in product shipments.  However, understanding this current 
environment and having the ability to adjust business structure and take advantage of 
associated opportunities will allow Regency to better position itself so as to gain a 
competitive advantage over its rivals.    
 
1.4   Chapter Summary 
This paper consists of four main chapters:  an introduction in chapter one; the 
industry analysis in chapter two; an implementation/internal analysis in chapter three; and 
the recommendations in chapter four. 
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The introduction in chapter one provided an outline of the scope and purpose of 
the project, an overview of the hearth industry, the focus firm, Regency Fireplace 
Products, and their current strategy and structure.   As well, the problems with Regency’s 
current strategy were presented. 
Chapter Two will address the external environmental factors that Regency does 
business in and identify the key success factors (KSFs) required to be competitive in the 
hearth industry.  A competitive analysis is provided to compare Regency against key 
competitors based on the KSFs to determine where the threats and opportunities arise.  
From this, strategic alternatives are developed for Regency to successfully compete in the 
hearth industry.  
 Chapter Three will examine Regency’s internal capabilities, and identifies gaps 
in resources and capabilities for implementation of the proposed strategic alternatives.  
The “Diamond-E Framework” is used to evaluate the strategic alternatives based on the 
environment, resource requirements, management preferences and organizational 
capabilities (Crossan et al, 2009).    
Chapter Four will outline the final recommendations based on the evaluations of 
the strategic alternatives to determine the strategic choice that best fits Regency and 
satisfies management decision criteria.   In closing, these final recommendations will also 
be used for conducting a timeline for implementation. 
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2: INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 
The following chapter will bring a thorough understanding to the external 
environment that Regency does business in.  In any industry, an incumbent’s success is 
determined by their sources of competitive advantage.  To further this analysis, these 
sources of advantage or key success factors (KSFs) will be identified through an industry 
assessment using Porter’s 5 Forces analysis (Crossan et al, 2009).  In looking at 
Regency’s direct competitors, a competitive analysis will be used to determine 
opportunities and threats to the KSFs identified.  By understanding these opportunities 
and threats, we can develop competitive strategic alternatives in order to improve the 
performance of Regency. 
 
2.1 Porter’s 5 Forces Analysis of the Industry 
Porter's 5 Forces analysis is a tool used in industry analysis that deals with 
factors outside an industry (macro environment) that influence the nature of competition 
within it and the forces inside the industry (micro environment) that influence the way in 
which firms compete.  A business has to understand the dynamics of its industry and 
markets in order to compete effectively in the marketplace.   This analysis tool 
comprises the forces driving competition and the resulting interaction of these forces 
acting on a business.   
In addition to rivalry among existing firms and the threat of new entrants into the 
market, there are also the forces of supplier power, buyer power, and the threat of 
substitute products or services.  Rivalry is often influenced by the competitive elements 
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from the other forces which explain the arrows from those elements to rivalry (see 
Figure 2.0).  Porter’s 5 Forces analysis suggests that the intensity of competition is 
determined by the relative strengths of these forces. These “forces” contribute to a firms 
profitability and success within the industry they do business. 
In applying Porter’s 5 Forces to the hearth industry, Figure 2.0 shows the relevant 
variables within the industry that can increase or decrease (threats or opportunities) these 
forces.   For each variable, the notation (+) is used if the force increases because of this 
variable, and (-) is used if the force decreases because of this variable. 
 
Figure 2.0:  Porter’s 5 Forces with the Relevant Variables in the Hearth Industry 
 
New Entrants
Threat of New Entrants
Rivalry
Industry Competitors
Intensity of Rivalry
Substitutes
Threat of Substitutes
Buyers
Bargaining Power of 
Buyers
Suppliers
Bargaining Power of 
Suppliers
Barriers to Entry = HIGH
Current styling/trend setting designs (+)
(brand awareness)
Dealer loyalty (+)
Government regulations (+)
Scale and scope of dealer network (+)
Sales training/support (+)
Technical training/support (+)
Benchmarking capabilities (+) 
High fixed costs (+)
Rivalry Among Competitors = HIGH
Large number of competitors (+)
Industry growth slowing (+)
High fixed costs (+)
High exit barriers (+)
Product and service differentiation (-)
Brand awareness (-)
Fragmented (+)
Power of Suppliers = HIGH
Concentrated key inputs (+)
Increased input costs (+)
Custom components (+)
Reliability and quality of supply (+)
Switching cost for incumbents (+)
Substitute inputs (-)
Sourcing off-shore (-)
Volume driven (+) Availability of Substitutes = LOW
Green technologies (+)
High energy prices (-)
Power of Buyers (Dealer) =  HIGH
Fragmented (-)
High switching costs (-)
Low consumer information (+)
Multi-competitor dealers (+)
Price sensitivity (+)
Incumbent presence at dealer (-)
Incumbents exploring forward integration (-)
Power of Buyers (Homeowner) = LOW
High switching costs (-)
High consumer information  (-)
Price sensitivity (+)
Low substitutes (-)
Consumer education (-)
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2.2 Threat of Entry (LOW) 
Threat of new entrants refers to the threat new competitors pose to existing 
competitors in an industry.  A profitable industry will attract more competitors looking to 
achieve profits.  When it is easy for these new entrants to enter the market (low entry 
barriers), this poses a threat to the firms already competing in that market. 
Progressive and high investment in R&D and product development is a KSF in 
keeping the threat of entry low.  In order to keep with changing consumer tastes, new 
product development is at the heart of the industry and firms will invest heavily into 
R&D and new product launch initiatives.  If any incumbent slows down in this process, 
they will quickly lose dealer support, sales and market share.  
Increasing technology, government/environmental regulations and stiffer testing 
and approval requirements can lengthen the time and add additional challenges and cost 
getting a new product to market.  Successful incumbents, such as Regency, have the 
necessary [engineering and R&D] resources and expertise to overcome these hurdles.  
Moreover, the learning curve with testing and approval requirements is steep and requires 
a long standing commitment among incumbents.  As a major step in the R&D process, a 
new entrant will find these hearth industry regulations and product testing approvals 
challenging and possibly discouraging barriers, thus creating a low threat for potential 
entry into the hearth industry. 
As consumer tastes and trends change, incumbents must stay abreast of these 
changes and quickly respond to market needs.  Environmental scanning is a KSF in 
understanding industry and consumer trends so as to reduce the power of new entrants.  
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Without it incumbents will slowly lose contact with the changing market and leave 
themselves vulnerable.  Regency continues to invest progressively in product 
development through a unique mix of competitive analysis, benchmarking and voice of 
the customer.  However, Regency’s low risk profile keeps them as a close follower in 
product design as opposed to the uncertainty of innovation acceptance in the market.   
The hearth industry is built on loyalty with a large scale dealer network, relying 
on the reputational capital of manufacturers.  A well established dealer network 
structured on scale and scope is a KSF in reducing the power of new entrants.   New 
incumbents can take years to develop and/or penetrate this network.  Moreover, the 
demands and requirements needed by manufacturers to secure and sustain dealers are 
high and require a vast scope of sales coverage across North America.   The more dealers 
in a manufacturer’s network, the more potential for sales.  
Other barriers of entry within the industry exist with large, high efficient 
manufacturing facilities that achieve economies of scale.  Regency experiences these 
scale economies by sharing resources and lowering average costs by producing a larger 
depth and breadth of product under one roof. 
Any new incumbent into the hearth industry will discover that developing brand 
identity is a barrier to entry.  Among the dealer network, brand carries reputational 
capital, and reputational capital can take years and high investment to obtain.  Over its 32 
years in business the Regency name is well established in the hearth industry. 
Through R&D and product development, manufacturers will submit patents for 
technology and design.  These patents can be a hurdle for existing competitors and pose 
as a barrier for new entrants. 
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2.3 Threat of Substitutes (LOW) 
A substitute is the availability of a product that the consumer can purchase instead 
of the industry’s product.   A substitute product is a product from another industry that 
offers similar benefits to the consumer as the product produced by the firms within the 
industry.   
The hearth industry for the most part deems substitutes as a low threat.  The 
industry is still considered to be of high growth potential and there are still many North 
Americans heating their homes with electricity or oil.  In the U.S., 8.1 million households 
are still heating their homes with heating oil (Green 3D Home, 2012).  These homes are 
slowly being converted over to wood or gas heat as oil has become a costly solution for 
home heating. 
Of course, new technologies in such areas as solar power/heating are emerging 
and something to keep an eye on.  The industry is wise to stay abreast with emerging 
energy technologies and applications.  Although it is true that green technologies may 
pose a threat in years to come, there still remains a large market for hearth products, not 
just as home heating products, but as focal areas for upgrading home comfort and décor.    
The closer incumbents can be to the consumer the better idea they will have of changing 
lifestyles, home design and personal needs.  
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2.4    Bargaining Power of Suppliers (HIGH) 
Supplier power refers to the pressure suppliers can exert on businesses by raising 
prices, lowering quality, or reducing availability of their products or service.  Suppliers 
can be defined as vendors, labor force or manufacturer supplying to retail. 
Suppliers of the key inputs in the hearth industry are for the most part 
concentrated and the majority of the hearth industry incumbents share these inputs.  This 
creates consolidated volume for the suppliers and keeps pricing on a relatively level 
playing field for all incumbents.  Overall, competitors in the hearth industry experience 
similar price increases from key input suppliers.  These higher input prices squeeze the 
manufacturers in their goal to maintain competitive selling prices.   
In an effort to be competitive in the hearth market and stay within the willingness 
to pay range, effective pricing structures at the retail level are crucial.  Off-shoring has 
become a KSF to reduce the bargaining power of suppliers while removing costs from the 
manufacturer’s product.  First movers into the market with new innovative product have 
the ability to set their retail price to what the market will bear.  Close followers in 
launching similar products are pressured to keep within this range.   As input costs can 
have a substantial impact to the retail price of a hearth product, incumbents will look to 
off-shore supply and/or build proactive supplier partnerships.  
However, off-shoring comes with its own dangers of inconsistent quality, high 
stocking inventories and delivery/lead time uncertainties.  Proactive supplier relationships 
and price negotiation expertise with these off-shore suppliers are KSFs for manufacturers 
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to be successful in the hearth industry and for keeping the bargaining power of on-shore 
suppliers low. 
Incumbents with unionized labor forces may experience higher power labor.  The 
hearth industry contains incumbents with both unionized labor and non-unionized labor.  
Being unionized and experiencing higher input costs than some competitors is one of the 
reasons Regency maintains its high margin business model and structures its product 
offering and pricing the way it does. 
 
2.5    Bargaining Power of Buyers  
Buyer bargaining power refers to the pressure consumers can exert on businesses 
to get them to provide higher quality products, better customer service, and lower prices. 
When analyzing the bargaining power of buyers, the industry analysis is being conducted 
from the perspective of the seller (the dealer) and the consumer (the homeowner).  
 
2.5.1    Bargaining Power of Dealers (HIGH)  
The MC dealer’s showroom floor will present several competitors’ products.  
Each product covers a specific design, segment, application, need and size.  The more 
diverse a manufacturer’s product lines are, the more there is an opportunity to “take” 
dealer showroom space.   Showroom space is a KSF in the hearth industry and the 
competition to achieve it can be fierce.  The more showroom space a manufacturer has 
the less power the dealer has against them.  Showroom space is obtained by finding an 
opportunity to improve a dealer’s business, whether it is a new dealer or an existing MC 
dealer.  Moreover, obtaining showroom space from a MC dealer increases the ability of 
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the incumbent to push out competition, gain exposure and maintain better control of 
pricing, thus reducing the force of the dealer.   
The power of the dealers is high and in order to obtain greater showroom space 
and capture greater dealer commitment, superior marketing support and customer service 
including sales and technical training and support are required.  These are all KSFs in 
reducing the effects of the dealer’s power.   
Proactive and innovative R&D is a high rated KSF in reducing the bargaining 
power of the dealer.  While some incumbents, including Regency, have ventured into 
single brand partnerships with dealers, most still distribute the majority of their products 
through-out North America via multi-competitor dealerships.  Dealers within the industry 
pose influence on the manufacturers in new product design, functionality, esthetics and 
price. Moreover, if dealers are disgruntled for any reason with the manufacturer, they 
may choose not to sell that product.  As such, poor product quality and/or availability can 
have a negative effect on a dealer deciding to sell a certain product or brand. 
Product quality/reliability is also a high rated KSF in lowering the power of 
dealers.  If a certain manufacturer’s products, in the eye of the dealer, are quality built 
and reliable (keeping warranty and service costs low), allow for a quick and easy install, 
and are priced within the consumer’s willingness to pay, the dealer will sell that product.  
However, if a dealer does not explain or “sell” the benefits of a certain product for a 
given higher price, and only allows the consumer to focus on price, the higher priced, 
higher quality products will be overlooked.   
Dealers prefer not to stock inventory and the peak sales of products are 
experienced in a short seasonal window.  If a manufacturer struggles keeping up with 
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demand and/or has longer than dealer expected lead times, the dealer will sell a 
competitor’s product which is in stock.  The dealer needs to make the sale, yet they do 
not want to stock the inventory.  Just in Time (JIT) delivery from the manufacturer is 
what is required.  This dynamic creates product availability as a KSF in reducing the 
bargaining power of the dealer.   
Effective pricing structure set by the manufacturers is a KSF in lowering the 
power of the dealer.   The profit the dealer makes is not just built into the final sale of the 
product, but rather the complete transaction; selling, freight, install, service and warranty.   
Some manufacturers submit a tiered retail pricing structure to the dealer and various 
marketing programs will supplement this.  Other manufacturers will heavily discount 
their products to the dealer at the expense of service and support.   
 Multi-competitor hearth dealers can have a substantial influence on the final 
purchase decision of the un-informed consumer.  The KSFs of environmental scanning 
and marketing support can help a manufacturer reduce this power.  The more the 
manufacturer can get close to the consumer and understand their needs the greater the 
chance of the consumer asking for a specific brand.  This can be done through developing 
a presence at the dealer level (fairs, home shows, etc.) and driving consumers into 
showrooms.  As well, it is important for manufacturers to drive consumers to their 
respective website(s) to facilitate education and brand awareness before they enter a MC 
dealer showroom. 
Another KSF in lowering the power of the MC dealer is forward integration.   As 
manufacturers move further up the supply chain and take a controlling interest in the 
distribution and sale of their products, the power imposed by the 3rd party dealer 
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diminishes and or is eliminated.    Forward integration can allow manufacturers to expand 
their own retail network, exploit their core competencies and increase profit margins.   
 
2.5.2    Bargaining Power of Homeowners (LOW) 
There are significant opportunities for the incumbent to lower the high buyer 
power of the MC dealer by looking at more direct consumer contact.   Dealer power is 
too high. Empowering the homeowner doesn’t mean making him/her strong, but rather to 
undermine the power of the dealer.   From an industry perspective, the customer is the 
dealer.  From Regency’s perspective, the customer is the homeowner.   
Fireplaces rank second among the top features desired by buyers of new 
homes; they are only second to outdoor patios, porches and decks.  Just over half of 
U.S. households have at least one fireplace or freestanding stove.  There were 
approximately 1.2 fireplaces per American home in 2010, with 80 percent of the 
homes having at least one fireplace or stove, and 21 percent having two or more 
(HPBA, 2011). 
Hearth products have a limited lifespan due to firebox, efficiency and 
performance deterioration.   Moreover, homeowner tastes and desires to 
upgrade/renovate typically take place in 10 year cycles.  The average age of a wood 
fireplace is 22 years.  The average age of a wood freestanding stove is 11 years and 
gas fireplaces are at an average age of 11 years (HPBA, 2011).  This creates a large 
market for renovation, retro-fit and custom designed products. 
The primary motivation of 42 percent of consumers that installed a hearth 
product in their home was to save on heating costs, while 19 percent wanted to make 
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a cold room warmer or to use the product as a backup source of heat.  Thirty-four 
percent of wood or pellet stove owners view their stove as a major heat source and 50 
percent consider it to be a secondary source of heat.   Forty-four percent of gas 
fireplace owners use their appliance as a supplemental heat source.  Fifty-eight 
percent of hearth owners consider their fireplace, wood or pellet stove or insert to be 
a major design feature in their home.  Fireplaces have a strong, positive effect on the 
value of a home and 46 percent of home buyers are willing to pay more for this 
feature (HPBA, 2011). 
 
Typical cost of a product including installation ($U.S.): 
• Fireplaces:  Open, EPA-certified wood fireplace $3,000-
$5,000, gas fireplace $3,000-$5,000.  
• Stoves:  Freestanding wood stove with new chimney 
$3,000-$4,200, pellet stove $3,500-$4,000.  
• Inserts:  Pellet, gas or EPA-certified wood insert into 
existing fireplace with new liner $3,000-$4,000. 
(Source: HPBA, 2011 State of the Hearth Industry Report) 
 
 Generally, consumers walking into a hearth retail store fit into one customer 
segment.  The majority of homeowners have limited knowledge, if any, about fireplaces 
or what these products cost.  They compare products when they get into a showroom.  If 
they want a certain product for a certain application they will pay the retail price.  The 
price difference between competitors’ products is usually within a few hundred dollars.  
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When two different brands are, for example, $200 apart from each other and the customer 
does not understand or is not told the reasons for this price difference, they will most 
likely buy the cheaper product.  This price difference, for the consumer who has limited 
knowledge of hearth products, is a big factor in their decision.  Therefore, it is a big 
factor for the dealer. 
The majority of homeowners who have conducted some product brand research 
and/or who have been well informed will have a higher willingness to pay for a quality 
product that fits their needs.  The internet is becoming a more important KSF for 
manufacturers as consumers are spending more time researching their future purchases 
on the web. 
  Those consumers who walk into a dealer’s store with minimal knowledge of 
hearth products will typically be swayed to the dealer’s choice with the biggest dealer 
spiffs or best chance of closing a sale with the less knowledgeable customer.  On the 
other hand, if a consumer walks into a dealer’s showroom and asks, for example, for 
Regency, the dealer will typically sell them Regency.  There is a whole new level of 
opportunity for incumbents to use the power of the internet, direct consumer contact and 
lead generation control to direct knowledge, brand awareness and the buying decision.   
 
2.6    Rivalry Intensity Among Existing Competitors (HIGH) 
The intensity of rivalry among competitors in an industry refers to the extent to 
which firms within an industry put pressure on one another and limit each other’s profit 
potential.  If rivalry is fierce, competitors are trying to steal profit and market share from 
one another. This reduces profit potential for all firms within the industry.    
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The level of rivalry in the hearth industry is high.  R&D and product development 
are KSFs in reducing this power.  And customer knowledge plays to this because it 
identifies the consumers who are willing to pay more for added utility and quality.   From 
trend setting styling and vast scope of product to the commitment of large investment into 
R&D, manufacturers must be proactive in these initiatives in order to maintain and 
increase an edge over the competition.   
Competitors in the industry all want the customer who walks into a showroom to 
buy their product.   Direct comparisons between brands will take place and without 
proper product benefit information given to customer, price can become the deciding 
factor.  Competitors strive to provide relevant information to the consumer through media 
such as web-sites, social media sites and U-tube.  The incumbent who can get this 
information across to more homeowners in a more effective way should increase their 
chances of out-performing their competitors on the showroom floor. 
Product quality in the high end hearth industry is critical and is a KSF in 
generating greater willingness to pay.  Reliable, high performing product with well 
finished esthetics and good warranties is the benchmark for manufacturers to increase 
their reputational capital and consumer sell through. 
As the hearth industry is a seasonal and sometimes cyclical business where there 
is a short window of opportunity to maximize sales, a KSF for manufacturers is having 
acceptable product availability to the market during these times.  Dealers do not like to 
hold inventory, so the manufacturers who have the product in stock within their 
distribution channels when it is needed, get the sale.   If a specific manufacturer’s product 
availability is not good, a competitor will take the sale. 
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The competition in obtaining and maintaining showroom space and product 
exposure in a MC dealer environment is fierce and is a KSF for manufacturers.  Those 
incumbents who can capture more showroom space reap rewards by potentially driving 
out competitors and gaining better price control.  Moreover, the pricing structure of a 
manufacturer’s product is a KSF in securing a competitive presence on the showroom 
floor. 
Capturing showroom space and driving out the competition are obtained through 
incumbents efforts in the KSF of customer service.   By finding and targeting 
opportunities to improve a dealer’s business, incumbents can use their specialization and 
knowledge in sales and technical training and support.  Incumbents in the hearth industry 
carry varying abilities in this area and the key is using customer service as a value added 
feature to the dealer in order to replace the competition. 
In competing in the high end hearth industry, manufacturers must have a well 
established dealer network across many North American regions in order to take 
advantage of scope and scale economies.  This dealer penetration and effectiveness is a 
KSF for manufacturers.  
Competitors need a thorough understanding of each other, and of customer trends 
and needs, to be successful in the hearth industry.  Several KSFs such as environmental 
scanning, web-based customer information/analytics and marketing support through 
attending and supporting consumer fairs and home shows are important to lower the force 
imposed by rivals.  Without taking part in these initiatives, incumbents will lose sight of 
the market opportunities and competitors will potentially take market share. 
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2.7    Industry Attractiveness 
Industry attractiveness is the magnitude and ease of a business making profit in 
comparison with the risks involved within the industry itself.  It is based on the overall 
effect of the powers of the 5 forces.  Table 2.0 below shows a summary of the forces and 
corresponding power associated with that force.   
 
Table 2.0:  Summary of the Hearth Industry 5 Forces Intensity  
Force  
 
Power 
Barriers to Entry 
 
 
 
HIGH 
   
Substitutes Availability  
 
LOW 
Supplier Power 
 
 
 
HIGH 
Buyer Power  
Multi-competitor Dealer 
Homeowner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HIGH 
LOW 
Rivalry 
 
 
 
HIGH 
Industry Attractiveness                    =   Attractive, yet slowing 
 
In summary, the hearth industry is a competitive mature landscape with several 
well established incumbents and brands.  The industry is still attractive but is getting less 
so primarily due to the high powers associated with buyers and rivals. 
The industry attractiveness has been declining due to the increasing power from 
the dealers.  All manufacturers are competing within this dealer environment and this 
makes for the high power of rivalry.  Bypassing the dealer through forward integration 
strategies, thus differentiating against rivals (creating a niche), will increase the 
profitability and attractiveness of the industry.  
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The barriers to new entry are high due to the specialization in R&D, customer 
information, sales and technical training and well established distribution systems.  The 
threat of substitute products remains low, yet emerging technologies progress such as 
“green” solutions should be watched.  Supplier power is high and off-shoring is a key 
factor in bringing product costs down.  Buyer power in the hearth industry contains two 
segments; the MC dealer and the homeowner.   The power of the MC dealer is high as 
opposed to the homeowner whose power is relatively lower.    
There is still a substantial market share available in North American with regards 
to residential heating and home décor upgrades.  As existing and new consumers look to 
build or upgrade their homes into the future, high end hearth products remain an 
increasing choice for home décor and heating comfort.  As such, there remains 
opportunity for direct consumer sales by bypassing the MC dealer and developing 
products that create direct customer value, utility and willingness to pay.  
Rivalry in the hearth industry among competitors remains high. The rivalry over 
the years has shifted from product differentiation to cost competition and loyalty at the 
dealer level.    New entrants are scare and many smaller incumbents have been merged 
into larger firms to develop economies of scope and scale.    
The market is product segmented and incumbents maintain advantage and 
compete at differing levels within specific geographic regions and product segments.    
As well, many growth opportunities exist in other global geographic regions.  Over the 
past 2 years, coming off the major effects if the U.S. economic crisis, the industry has 
maintained investment in product development, re-structured strategies and is positioning 
for an expected slow growth into the future. 
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2.8   Key Success Factors 
As a result of the 5 Force Analysis above, several Key Success Factors (KSFs) 
have been identified as prevalent in the hearth industry.  Table 2.1 lists these KSFs, a 
summary of what each KSF consist of, the force in which the KSF exists and the relevant 
importance of each KSF within the industry.  These ratings are determined from the 
perspective of the dealer network. 
 
2.8.1    R&D – Product Innovation (High Importance) 
Product innovation and development is of prime importance in the hearth 
industry.  Without progressive investment in R&D, incumbents will very quickly fall 
short in the marketplace.  Competitors take different strategies with product innovation; 
some choose to be industry leaders and risk the uncertainty of trendy products, while 
others take less risk with a close follower approach.  Competitors use these strategies to 
achieve differentiation. 
 
2.8.2    Product Quality (High Importance) 
The high end hearth industry is built on high quality products.  Product quality is 
a differentiator in the industry.  A greater willingness to pay and loyalty is achieved 
through the strong reputational capital of manufacturer’s ability to consistently design 
and produce reliable, esthetically pleasing and user friendly products.  As knowledge of 
hearth products with homeowners is limited, they are partial to knowing they will be 
purchasing a high quality and safe product.  As quality level drops, so does reputational 
capital across the industry. 
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Table 2.1:  Key Success Factors (KSFs) for the Hearth Industry 
KSF KSF Description Industry Force Importance Rating 
3=very key/2=key/1=less key 
R&D - Product 
Innovation 
Current styling/Trend setting 
Dealer loyalty 
High investment 
Diverse scope 
New Entrants 
Rivalry  
Buyer Power 
(dealer) 
3 
Product Quality Esthetics/Workmanship 
Reliability/Performance 
Warranty 
Reputational capital 
Rivalry 
Buyer Power 
(dealer) 
3 
Product Availability In-Stock 
On-demand/ lead time 
Reputational capital 
Buyer Power 
(dealer) 
Rivalry 
3 
Dealer Network Scale and scope 
Geographic coverage 
New Entrants 
Rivalry 
3 
Dealer Showroom 
Space 
Brand exposure 
Price control 
Drive out competitors 
Rivalry 
Buyer Power 
(dealer) 
3 
Forward 
Integration 
Control distribution 
Control retail sales 
Product exclusivity 
Buyer Power 
(dealer) 
Rivalry 
3 
Customer Service Sales training/support 
Technical training/support 
Specialization/Knowledge 
Reputational capital 
New Entrants  
Rivalry 
Buyer Power 
(dealer) 
2 
Environmental 
Scanning 
Benchmarking competition 
Home décor trends 
Customer tastes/needs 
New Entrants 
Rivalry 
Buyer Power 
2 
Price Structure (low 
cost) 
 
MSRP  
Discounts/Promotions 
Rivalry 
Buyer Power 
(dealer) 
2 
Web-Based 
Customer Info 
 
Consumer education 
Brand awareness 
Analytics 
Rivalry 
Buyer Power 
(homeowner) 
2 
Marketing Support Dealer support 
Events, Fairs, Trade Shows 
Website/Programs 
Rivalry 
Buyer Power 
(dealer) 
 
2 
Off-Shoring Supply Lower input prices 
Custom components 
 
Supplier Power 2 
Supplier 
Partnerships 
 
Lower Input Price 
Reliability 
Product Design Process 
Supplier Power 1 
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2.8.3   Product Availability (High Importance) 
As the hearth industry is a seasonal business and consumers generally do not 
consider home heating solutions until the weather gets cold, there is a relatively short 
window to sell and install products into a home.  Moreover, hearth dealers recognize this 
and rely on the manufacturers to supply products in a quick and efficient manner.  Hence, 
product availability is crucial to securing and finalizing a sale.   If a dealer cannot rely on 
the manufacturer having sufficient stock and/or lead time is too long, the dealer, in their 
goal to make a sale, will sell a competitor’s product. 
 
2.8.4    Dealer Network (High Importance) 
For hearth industry incumbents to be successful, they need to develop and 
maintain a dealer network.  The effectiveness of this network depends on scope and scale 
economies across many regional areas.  A typical manufacturer will manage anywhere 
from 800 – 2000 specialty dealers across North America.  The majority of these dealers, 
and in Regency’s case up to 80%, are MC dealers.   Without the expertise, knowledge of 
a vast dealer network to promote, sell and install hearth products to the homeowner, 
manufacturers would lose market share. 
 
2.8.5    Dealer Showroom Space (High Importance) 
One of the main success factors in bringing on new dealers and maintaining 
existing dealers is the amount of showroom space a manufacturer can obtain.  Showroom 
space is all about brand awareness and product breadth and exposure.  Without sufficient 
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space captured for a certain manufacturer’s products, there is a threat of the consumer 
being drawn to a competitor’s product line.  In the multi-competitor environment, there 
continues to be a fierce battle in competitors trying to push each other out and grab more 
space.   This is done through product innovation, pricing structures, full product line 
offerings and value added support to the dealer. 
 
2.8.6    Forward Integration (High Importance) 
Forward integration strategies would allow manufacturers to gain more control 
over the distribution and sale of their end products.   Manufacturers can achieve more 
control downstream in the supply chain through owning their distribution centers to 
bypassing the traditional dealer network and creating their own retail network.   These 
strategies will reduce the power of the dealer and put increased customer information, 
profit making potential and market share gain in the hands of the manufacturer. 
Some manufacturers own a small portion of their distribution centers, while a 
select few own up to 100% of their distribution centers.   Others still make full use of 
wholesalers and 3rd party distributors.  Currently, no manufacturer in the hearth industry 
has forwardly integrated into the retail sector. 
 
2.8.7    Customer Service (Medium Importance) 
In looking at value added support to the dealer, delivering superior customer 
service is a key success factor for manufacturers.  This level of service includes sales 
training and support and technical training, information, and resources.   The way in 
which a manufacturer responds to a dealers needs, can have a large bearing on the dealers 
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influence to sell that manufacturers products.  Some manufacturers, such as Regency, use 
customer service as a differentiation.  Regency puts great effort into a high level of 
customer service in order to ensure the benefits of their products are being promoted and 
supported in the field.  Moreover, a manufacturers reputational capital rests on the level 
to which they support and stand behind their products.  
 
2.8.8    Environmental Scanning (Medium Importance) 
The ability for manufacturers to stay abreast with a changing market and 
consumer needs, it is important that some level of environmental scanning take place.   
Understanding consumer utility, home décor styling trends and competitor products, a 
manufacturer will be more effective with product innovation initiatives.   However, some 
manufacturers take a more passive approach and allow a competitor’s innovation efforts 
to direct their product development.  
 
2.8.9    Price Structure (Medium Importance) 
Retail pricing on high end hearth products tends to range on criteria of quality, 
features, performance and functionality.   Some competitor’s strategy is lower quality for 
lower prices, while others maintain higher range pricing for high quality benefits.    Low 
price is a KSF in battling against using differentiation.  There is however a higher 
willingness to pay if the consumer gains knowledge through research and/or a dealer 
takes the time to explain the higher quality products to the consumer.  Pricing structures 
are a competitive tool for manufacturers that consist of discounts, promotions, dealer 
incentives, and payment terms. 
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2.8.10    Web-based Customer Information (Medium Importance) 
The internet has become an increasing competency for manufacturers in the 
hearth industry.   In North America, most homeowners have access to web services and 
have shown increasing use of the internet for researching future purchases.  
Manufacturers can use web-analytic tools to track specific website traffic as consumer 
tastes and preferences.   Incumbents in the hearth industry can leverage these trends 
through delivering customer valued information.   A manufacturer’s website is becoming 
an increasingly effective means to educate the consumer directly with a brand of hearth 
product so as to influence their buying decision.  
 
2.8.11    Marketing Support (Medium Importance) 
Marketing support in the hearth industry is seen in varying degrees of intensity.  
This support consists of dealer marketing materials, promotions and dealer incentives and 
presence and assistance with industry fairs, events and trade shows.   Some incumbents in 
the hearth industry spend a high level of effort in the presence of the dealer at fairs and 
events to ensure that the manufacturers brand is being promoted effectively.  Other 
incumbents will only push incentives to the dealers so as to influence the dealer’s 
decision. 
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2.8.12    Off-shoring Supply (Medium Importance) 
In an effort to battle increasing costs and remain competitive on retail price, 
manufacturers look to reduce raw material input costs by using off-shoring alternatives.  
Developing an off-shore supplier base that will deliver sufficient quality and reliability at 
low unit cost is an ongoing initiative for hearth manufacturers.   Off-shoring is an 
effective measure in competing against a low price retail strategy. 
 
2.8.13    Supplier Partnerships (Low Importance) 
Whether off-shore or more local, supplier partnerships are important within the 
hearth industry.   Effective partnerships between suppliers and manufacturers that are 
built on a win-win platform create an understanding of business cycles, trends and 
constraints.  Communications from effective partnerships allow for trust, accountability 
and reliability.  As stated earlier, with the hearth industry being seasonal and cyclical, 
these benefits are in the best interest for both supplier and manufacturer.  However, 
effective partnerships still do not guard against increasing input costs. 
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2.9    Competitive Analysis 
For the purposes of this paper we will look at two key competitors of Regency to 
gain an understanding of where these incumbents are situated with each other in terms of 
size, established presence in the hearth industry and product offering.    Travis Industries 
and Napoleon Fireplaces are the closest to Regency in terms of years in the industry, 
product segments, sales revenue, employee headcount, shared dealer network and 
specialized capabilities.  The following section will give a brief description of these two 
key competitors and then summarize a relative competitive analysis, rating these 
competitors with Regency against the industry key success factors. 
 
 
2.9.1    Main Competitors 
 The main competitors of Regency that serve the hearth industry operate 
with differing strategies.  Travis Industries, like Regency, runs its business with a 
differentiation strategy with high quality products and a loyal dealer network.  Napoleon 
Fireplaces, unlike Regency, runs a more cost-based strategy, based on a large breadth of 
lower quality product and a fragmented distribution model. 
 
  
2.9.1.1    Travis Industries  
 Travis Industries (Travis), founded in 1979, is a privately owned wood, 
pellet and gas stove, insert and fireplace company in Mukilteo, Washington.  They 
design, manufacture and distribute four high-quality brands: Fireplace Xtrordinair, 
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Avalon, Lopi and Tempest Torch.  These brands make up a multitude of product lines 
that all available exclusively from a network of more than 1,200 authorized retailers 
throughout the United States, Canada, Australia and China.  Travis’ products are 
manufactured within an 11-acre facility called the House of Fire employing up to 600 
employees (Travis, 2012). 
Travis employs approximately one half of the sales force as Regency.  Travis 
focuses on a loyalty program with a smaller number of dealers.  These dealers are treated 
as “family” relations with Travis, and these relations are built on mainstream state of art 
product innovation.   This is Travis’ differentiation in the market and they hold this 
loyalty in place be using recognition programs with their dealers through annual events 
and trips.   
 
 
2.9.1.2    Napoleon Fireplaces  
Napoleon Fireplaces (Napoleon) was founded in 1976 from a steel railings start-
up called Wolf Steel in Barrie, Ontario, Canada.   With a primary focus in the Ontario 
hearth market until the mid 1980s, Napoleon has since expanded their fireplace products 
throughout Canada and into the United States.   Their products range from wood and gas 
fireplaces (inserts and stoves), gourmet gas and charcoal grills, outdoor living products 
and waterfalls.   Napoleon operates with 500,000+ square feet of manufacturing space 
and over 400 employees (Napoleon, 2012). 
Napoleon has created a distribution system focusing on a smaller number of sales 
force then Regency’s, that work to a tiered wholesale structure to the dealer.   Napoleon 
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sales force, in this structure, virtually has zero control over the dealers’ purchase 
decisions.  Dealers essentially can choose and dictate price from the multiple Napoleon 
wholesalers.  The Napoleon strategy is built around developing vast product lines of low 
quality and low cost hearth products.  
 
 
2.9.2    Relative Competitive Analysis 
When comparing hearth industry competitors to industry KSF’s it should be noted 
that the KSF’s identified are the same for the various product segments (wood, gas and 
pellet) offered to consumers.  Table 2.2 shows the relative competitive analysis with the 
above main competitors based on the importance of the industry KSFs.     
This competitive analysis will rate each competitor against the KSF in terms of 
importance to the industry.  The higher the score at each KSF the stronger the 
manufacturer is in that KSF.   It is important to note, that traditionally, manufacturers in 
the hearth industry have structured their entire business models to the MC dealer 
environment. 
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Table 2.2:  Relative Competitive Analysis 
 Industry 
Importance 
Rating 
Competitor Rankings to KSFs 
  5=strong                    3=average                     1=weak 
Key Success Factors (KSFs) 3=very key 
2= key  
1=less key 
Travis 
Industries 
Napoleon 
Fireplaces 
Regency 
Fireplace 
Products 
R&D - Product Innovation 3 5 3 3 
15 9 9 
Product Quality 3 5 2 5 
15 6 15 
Product Availability  3 3 3 5 
9 9 15 
Dealer Network 3 4 2 5 
12 6 15 
Dealer Showroom Space 3 5 3 3 
15 9 9 
Forward Integration 
 
 
3 3 0 5 
9 0 15 
Customer Service 2 3 2 5 
6 4 10 
Environmental Scanning 2 3 3 3 
6 6 6 
Price Structure (low cost) 2 3 5 3 
6 10 6 
Web-Based Customer Info 
 
 
2 3 5 3 
6 10 6 
Marketing Support 2 1 3 5 
2 6 10 
Off-Shoring Supply 2 4 5 4 
8 10 8 
Supplier Partnerships 1 4 5 4 
4 5 4 
Overall Scores  113 90 128 
 
Note:  The individual competitor scores against KSFs have been derived and from the 2011 
Dealer Survey Results, conducted on an annual basis by Regency Fireplace Products in conjunction with 
Regency sales and marketing representatives; sample size of 500 survey respondents included Regency 
dealers and non-Regency dealers.    
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2.9.3    Opportunities 
As shown in the above Table 2.3, Regency outscores competitors in product 
availability, equals Travis with high scores in product quality and outscores all 
competitors in customer service.   These are all opportunities Regency can leverage so as 
to capture consumer interest, build brand awareness and develop better control over the 
selling process.   
The hearth industry is a seasonal business with a short window when homeowners 
are looking to upgrade their home heating solutions.  There is an opportunity in this 
period to maximize sales in the winter months and superior product availability is critical 
to an incumbent’s success.  Regency leads the industry with excellent product availability 
which has added to their reputation of superior customer service.  Well structured, wholly 
owned and controlled distribution centers continue to have a substantial bearing for this 
excellence.       
Regency scores high with product quality, as does their competitor, Travis.  
Exceptional product quality and workmanship have always been the pride of Regency.   
In the hearth industry, product quality refers to the esthetics, reliability, performance, 
ease of use and materials used in the construction and warranty aspects of the product.   
Charged at a higher price, excellent quality in hearth products does increase a customer’s 
willingness to pay and this generates a huge opportunity for Regency.    
Consumers are willing to pay more for a hearth product that is safe and reliable, 
easy to use and satisfies their styling.  However, at the MC retail level, the dealer does 
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not always articulate or convince these benefits to the consumer.  If a consumer does not 
understand product quality differences, they will lean toward the lower priced products.   
On a less important industry success factor, Regency outscores competitors in 
marketing support as well.  Marketing support in the industry refers to the effort and 
involvement in fairs, events, home shows and dealer support around North America.  
Although less important to the industry overall by means of competitors not putting much 
effort in this area,  Regency feels their efforts and investment is much needed in order to 
take more control at the consumer level. 
  Regency has recently developed a dynamic leads generation and control system 
whereby they capture and own the sales lead generated from these fairs and home shows.  
From there, Regency can educate their products benefits and influence the consumer to 
ask for a Regency product when they visit a dealer’s showroom.   Moreover, Regency’s 
market presence alongside a dealer(s) at fairs and home shows can ensure the dealer is 
promoting Regency product proactively to the consumer. 
 
2.9.4    Threats 
In looking at Table 2.3 above, the areas of key success factors where competitors 
outscore Regency is with product innovation and pricing structures. Regency is well 
known as a close follower with product development in the hearth industry.  Regency’s 
competitors have come to respect this and Regency dealers have come to reluctantly 
accept it.   Regency’s view is that innovation is costly and unpredictable.   As a low risk, 
conservative company Regency has been able to stay fairly abreast of consumer tastes 
and styling.   Regency has experienced falling behind in product development in its 
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history.   This has proven damaging to Regency in terms of dealer loyalty and 
sustainment.   However, over the last five to six years, Regency has re-gained focus, 
commitment, and investment back into positioning themselves as a quick decision 
making and responder to competitor innovation and market trends.  Survival in the hearth 
industry heavily depends on progressive and continuous new product development and/or 
existing product upgrades.  Regency competitors currently have an upper hand in a more 
innovative approach to new product launch.   As such, this key success factor remains a 
threat for Regency.  
Another KSF that continues to challenge the Regency strategy is pricing structure 
of hearth products.  Regency scores low against Napoleon in pricing structure, yet is 
competitive with Travis.  Regency’s position is with retail pricing is the mid to high level 
structure.   Based on Regency’s strategy of high quality, high margin products, they have 
made a conscious decision not to allow their products to market at low price yielding low 
margin.   However, the threat comes from the dealer not explaining the benefits of the 
higher priced Regency product and hence the consumer settles to focus on price.   
Consumers, having limited knowledge of hearth products or brand, can be very 
much influenced by the dealer’s direction and opinion.   In the hearth industry, high 
quality products that are safe and reliable do lend themselves a higher willingness to pay 
with the homeowner.  However, the benefits and customer value need to be explained to 
the consumer for this to take place.   
The customer value aspects of hearth products are not usually visible to the eye 
alone and without the dealer and/or manufacturer properly educating the consumer as to 
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the benefits for cost; price will be the primary focus.  At that point, hearth products could 
be seen as commodities.  This is in essence the threat to Regency. 
 
2.10    Strategic Alternatives 
Looking back at the problems with Regency’s current strategy and understanding 
their opportunities and threats derived from the industry and competitive analysis, there 
are strategic alternatives that would favorably alter Regency’s performance in the hearth 
industry. 
As Regency discovered in the early nineteen nineties, venturing into wholly 
owned distribution centers created an effective level of control and focus in getting their 
products to market.  Wholly owned distribution centers, a differentiator in the industry at 
that time, allowed Regency to develop their products into a growing dealer network to 
take advantage of scale and scope economies.   Now in 2012, as competitors have caught 
up to this distribution model, the MC dealer network is the source of hampering 
Regency’s differentiation in the market.  This again is where more forward integration 
thinking may pose advantage to Regency into the future. 
For Regency to stay status quo and make no changes to their strategy would pose 
many risks to growth potential, market share and maintaining their high margin model.  
As earlier stated, MC dealers comprise of 90% of Regency’s complete dealer network 
and the other 10% are Regency only dealers (but not wholly owned).  It can be seen that 
the control of the complete selling process is not in Regency’s hands and this makes the 
risks prevalent. 
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Regency’s management preference is to maintain their high quality, high margin 
renovation market model and therefore competing on cost-based strategies is not an 
option.  However, management preference does see benefits in more control through 
forward integration.  Regency’s advantage in customer service and presence at the dealer 
level shows this commitment to controlling more of the selling process for their products.  
 
2.10.1   The Concept of Economic Surplus 
It is important to note that the main reason to consider forward integration 
strategies is not entirely “value added” advantages or “closer to the customer” reasoning, 
but rather economic surplus (Stuckey & White, 1993).   Economic surplus comprises of 
consumer surplus and producer surplus and Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between 
the two on the supply and demand curves. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Economic Surplus Graph 
 
(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_surplus) 
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Consumer surplus is the difference between the total amount that consumers are 
willing to pay for a good or service (indicated by the demand curve) and the total amount 
that they actually pay (the market price).  Producer surplus is the difference between 
what producers are willing to supply a good for and the price they actually receive. The 
level of producer surplus is shown by the area above the supply curve and below the 
market price. (Riley, 2006) 
By exploring forward integration strategies, Regency can obtain better control 
over sales and prices and capture upstream profit margin, through the economic surplus 
concept.   It is important to note that economic surplus is more likely to arise the closer 
you are to the customer because at this stage you can obtain any available consumer 
surplus (Stuckey & White, 1993). By having more direct influence on the consumer, with 
no middleman (MC dealer), Regency has better access to this consumer surplus through 
selling the benefits of Regency products and capturing a greater willingness to pay.  As 
strategic alternatives are looked at, the concept of economic surplus needs to be a factor 
in achieving Regency’s goal of having better control over the complete selling process.   
The remaining of this chapter will outline strategic alternatives and what these 
alternatives would entail.  Again, these strategic alternatives are to develop a more 
controlling factor in the complete selling process of Regency products and mitigate the 
risks stated above.  The two strategic alternatives that will be proposed are Corporate 
Retail Ownership and The Regency Franchise. 
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2.10.2    Corporate Retail Ownership (Strategic Alternative #1) 
When looking at forward integration strategies, the question is what extent of 
control would be right for Regency to seek at the retail level.    Corporate owned retail, or 
full integration, would involve an infrastructure which Regency currently does not have.   
However, 100% control over the selling process would be achieved with this strategic 
alternative.   
Although a consistently profitable company, Regency is a low risk profile, private 
company with limited shareholders.  As such, resources to gain financial backing into 
wholly owned retail ventures would need close analysis and the costs would be high. 
The initial impact of undercutting existing dealers would need to taken into 
consideration as geographic locations are being assessed.   Brand exposure and relevance 
to the homeowner are crucial in determining locations.  It is important to realize that 
bringing in wholly owned stores would be a slow, phased process with careful attention 
given to regional locations with normal seasonal weather patterns and higher targeted 
population.  Proximity to Regency’s distribution centers is of importance to minimize 
inventory at the retail level, create just in time (JIT) delivery and ensure profitability at 
each store.  
Pilot project stores operating in key areas over a complete business would test the 
viability of such a venture.   Viability can also be tested with respect to the relative 
demographic and age of housing infrastructure.  For example, locating a store in the 
proximity of a cluster of just new home construction will not see much consumer traffic 
because there is no need to upgrade or renovate these homes for several years. 
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High consumer traffic areas surrounded by complimenting products and services, 
such as home décor and furnishing stores would be most effective.  Mutual working 
relationships with these complimenting businesses would help drive consumers into 
Regency stores.    
Human resource and change management factors will be prevalent in sourcing the 
right people to deliver a unique customer experience that can ensure Regency’s 
differentiation strategy remains.  More than just a fireplace store, Regency would need to 
create a complete fireplace “solutions” store, delivering consumer friendly information 
and entire room décor ideas centering on the hearth product.   The value proposition 
would be to make the fireplace solution purchase easy for the consumer. 
Wholly owned retail means having Regency employees and therefore 
compensation and commission structure will need to weigh against revenue per store 
projections.  Above average dealers in the hearth industry sell and install approximately 
300 units per year.  This volume is typically constrained by install resource capacity.  
Moreover, other seasonal products (to offset hearth seasonality) will in fact need to be 
offered to generate additional revenue streams. 
 
2.10.3   The Regency Franchise (Strategic Alternative #2) 
As wholly owned retail stores (full forward integration) gives 100% control to 
Regency with a more defined and narrow location criteria, the franchise model decreases 
some control but potentially adds more store exposure across a wider scope of geographic 
areas, while reducing financial risk. 
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Developing a franchise model in the United States entails meeting several 
requirements under individual state legislation.  As well, Regency will be required to 
prepare a standard disclosure document for a franchise operation.  This document, called 
the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) is required of all companies, by the 
Federal Trade Commission, if they want to offer franchises for sale anywhere in the 
United States.  To facilitate the franchise process, Regency will need the services of an 
experienced franchise development consultant. 
As part of the legal aspects of setting up a franchise, Regency will need to prepare 
audited financial statements for the franchise company.    Other considerations are 
whether Regency should set up another company to franchise their concept or if they 
want to use the existing business entity they are operating in as the franchise company. 
Regency is an evolved culture of over 32 years of being a performance driven 
company.   Effective and efficient business and operational systems have contributed to 
this.   Going forward with a franchise model, Regency will need to develop and 
document the systems that a franchisee will use to run their respective business 
successfully.   These systems would comprise of sales training, product and technical 
training, marketing plans and financial/accounting services and structure.   
To ensure a successful franchise model, finding the right people to run these 
businesses is crucial.   It is important to note for Regency that franchisees are not 
employees and they need to be treated as such.  Moreover, for Regency to follow its goal 
of more control of the complete selling process, they will have to ensure the franchisees 
do what Regency wants and needs, on a consistent basis, with regards to their products 
and service.   Again, Regency would need to supply the ‘system’ and then monitor 
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closely the quality of execution.  Having a flagship franchise store where franchisees can 
come and learn these systems would be critical for Regency’s success. 
 
2.11    Strategic Alternatives Summary 
Corporate Retail Ownership and Regency Franchise, respectively, would facilitate 
control of the selling process, lower the threat of rivalry and generate economic surplus.   
The elimination of competitor’s product from entering showroom space and a fully 
focused store on marketing, promoting and selling Regency product would take full 
advantage of Regency’s core competencies. 
The following Chapter 3 will discuss implementation through understanding 
Regency’s internal capabilities and whether those capabilities are sufficient or could be 
made sufficient to implement one or more of the above strategic alternatives. 
 
  
59 
 
 
3: IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS 
An implementation analysis determines whether the internal capabilities of 
Regency are, or could be, made capable of achieving the strategic alternatives proposed 
in Chapter 2.   The “Diamond-E Framework” is used to evaluate the strategic alternatives 
based on the environment, resource requirements, management’s preferences and the 
organization’s capabilities (Crossan et al, 2009). 
 
3.1    Diamond-E Framework (Crossan et al, 2009) 
As the environment analysis was conducted in Chapter 2 with Porter’s 5 Forces, 
the remaining Diamond-E Framework tests the strategic alternatives in Chapter 2 against 
three analyses: 
• Management Preference Analysis; 
• Organization Analysis; and  
• Resources Analysis. 
 
The Management Preference Analysis determines how well the proposed strategic 
alternative fits with management’s preference.  This includes preferences which may 
reflect personal and/or professional values, personality traits, experience level and 
leadership styles.  It also includes standard decision criteria like the expected sales and 
profitability growth and maintaining to the budget.  Management, for the purposes of this 
paper, will consist of the key contributors to decision making within Regency.  The 
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management team will consist of the Founder and CEO, President, and Vice Presidents 
(Operations/R&D, Sales & Marketing, Finance/IT).   
The Organizational Analysis determines how well the proposed strategic 
alternative fits with the organizational structure.   This analysis will also take into 
consideration Regency’s systems and organization culture. 
The Resource Analysis determines how well the proposed strategic alternative fits 
with the organizational resources available.  This analysis will take into consideration the 
operational, human and financial resources available within Regency. 
It is important to note that if the internal capabilities of Regency cannot be made 
to satisfy the strategic requirements of an option, then it is dropped from the analysis as 
unworkable (Crossan et al., 2009). 
 
3.2    Assessment of Strategic Alternative #1 
Strategic Alternative #1 is proposed as Corporate Retail Ownership.  In this 
alternative, Regency would wholly own the retail stores for which to market and sell its 
products.    
 
3.2.1    Management Preference Analysis 
Management preference analysis will consider management objectives, 
management experience, management team and leadership.   Each of these preferences 
will be assessed below. 
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3.2.1.1    Management Objectives 
In adopting Corporate Retail Ownership, 100% of the complete selling process 
would be under the sole control of Regency.   This brings a new dynamic of 
understanding and commitment to the retail business in the hearth industry.      
Table 3.0 below summarizes the required preferences of the alternative and 
compares them to the preferences that are observed amongst the key decision-makers for 
Regency.  The resulting gaps and gap-closing recommendations are also summarized for 
each preference. 
The management team, under this strategic alternative, will need to change the 
overall long standing business model of lower volume-high margin.  To get around the 
seasonal and cyclical nature of the hearth business, Regency will have to commit to a 
significant amount of investment in innovative product development, financial support, 
and sourcing and/or developing other seasonal products to off-set slow periods of hearth 
sales. These products would comprise of low margin patio, garden and barbeque 
products.    
The entire investment for the start-up would be the responsibility of Regency and 
while assuming all profits, they would be the bearer of all losses as well.  There must be 
an understanding that opening company owned stores will take a lot of capital and time 
and yield high risk.  Opening each store can be a slow proposition in location selection, 
capital funding, hiring and training. 
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Table 3.0:  Management Objectives Under Strategic Alternative #1 
Corporate Retail Ownership 
Management 
Subject 
Required 
Preferences 
Observed  
Preferences 
Major Gaps Gap-Closing 
Analysis 
Founder and 
CEO 
 
 
 
 
Interest in a high 
level of 
commitment to 
seasonal hearth 
business  w/low 
margin products 
Interest in doing 
“the least amount 
of effort for the 
most margin” 
Need an interest in 
absorbing lower 
margin products into 
core high margin. 
Needs new vision, 
new core 
Change long term 
mindset to allow 
different business 
model(s) 
President 
 
 
 
 
Interest in 
developing a 
effective retail 
chain with 
seasonal product 
offerings 
Interest in the 
hearth industry 
and associated 
products only 
Need an interest in 
diversifying product 
line into non-hearth 
seasonal products. 
Doesn’t know the 
new lines. 
Increase knowledge, 
experience and 
investment across 
organization 
VP Finance/IT 
 
 
 
Interest in 
developing solid 
financial systems 
across retail stores 
Interest in 
profitability of 
current company 
financial model 
structure. Keeping 
risk low 
Interest to expand 
financial support 
and reach into retail 
businesses at a 
higher risk model 
Increase financial 
resources to support 
while accepting  risk 
VP Operations/ 
R&D 
 
 
 
 
Interest in voice of 
the consumer and 
market driven 
trends to drive 
innovative product 
development 
Interest in being 
reactive to market 
trends and a close 
follower approach 
Interest to becoming 
more innovative in 
product designs and 
other non-related 
products 
Develop a more 
proactive market 
research, design 
team and investment 
VP Sales & 
Marketing 
 
 
 
 
Interest in driving 
consumers into 
retail stores 
Interest in 
supporting MC 
dealers to push 
Regency sales 
Interest to create 
more control over 
consumer leads and 
potential 
undercutting MC 
dealers. No 
expertise with non 
fireplace products 
Shift marketing and 
sales focus from 
dealer to consumer 
direct with varying 
product segments 
 
 
3.2.1.1.1    Gaps in Management Objectives 
Based on observations and history with Regency, as well as through interviews 
with the management team, there appear to be significant gaps between the preferences of 
management and the required preferences to make this strategic alternative move 
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forward.  As Table 3.0 shows, the gaps that exist will actually have a substantial impact 
on the long standing corporate objectives of the organization.   
Although the VP’s of Marketing and Finance seem confident in the gap closing 
factors, there was a fairly strong consensus that this strategic alternative would bring too 
much disruptive change to Regency.  This alternative would involve taking on 
completely different types of products into sourcing, buying and distribution.  These 
added challenges and risks are feared to disrupt an already complex business.  Most of 
this management team has been with Regency between 16 to 20 years and high-risk 
change is not in their preference. 
 
3.2.1.1.2   Suggested Gap-Bridging Solution 
 To close these substantial gaps will require significant changes to the long 
standing business model of the Founder and CEO of Regency.   It will also put the 
company into a higher risk profile than the management team prefers to be in. 
The management team and specifically the Founder and CEO will most likely 
decline this alternative of corporate retail ownership due to the drastic change in business 
objectives and financial risk.  Therefore, this alternative fails because it cannot satisfy 
management preference no matter how competitive it would be in the industry 
environment.  
 
3.2.2    Summary of Assessment 
Regency’s goal of obtaining a more controlling factor over the complete selling 
process at the retail level would be achieved through implementation of this strategic 
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alternative.  However, because the management team is very unlikely to move forward 
with this proposal, the strategic alternative of Corporate Retail Ownership will not be 
considered any further.   
In addition, and in interviewing the Founder and CEO, it is understood that 
Regency will not deviate from its long standing corporate objective of a high-margin 
financial model.  By the high investment in wholly owned stores and in distributing 
various other seasonal non-hearth products, the business model will see much 
complication and add heavy risk to Regency’s financial structure. 
 
3.3    Assessment of Strategic Alternative #2 
Strategic Alternative #2 is proposed as the Regency Franchise.  In this alternative, 
Regency would develop a franchised retail model across selected regional areas in which 
to market and sell its products.    
 
3.3.1    Management Preference Analysis 
3.3.1.1    Management Objectives 
In adopting a Regency Franchise model, the management team, would need 
interest in creating a common, standardized approach to these retail stores.  Building 
brand image and customer experience would be of top priority.   This franchise model 
would be the first of its kind in the hearth industry.     
The management team, under this strategic alternative, will have the added 
complexities of finding and maintaining the “right” people and resources to operate these 
65 
 
franchises.   Moreover, the systems and controls required to ensure consistent experience 
from one store to the next would need a robust monitoring and audit system. 
Table 3.1 below summarizes how this compares to the preferences that are 
observed amongst the key decision-makers for Regency. 
 
Table 3.1:  Management Objectives Under Strategic Alternative #2 
Regency Franchise 
Management 
Subject 
Required 
Preferences 
Observed  
Preferences 
Major Gaps Gap-Closing 
Analysis 
Founder and 
CEO 
 
 
 
 
Interest in a 
developing a 
respected 
company image 
though a unique 
customer 
experience   
Generally match 
with required 
preferences, 
though finding the 
“right” store 
owners is a 
concern 
Maintaining a 
consistent franchise 
image with multiple 
business owners 
Developing a 
“formula” and careful 
selection of business 
owners and 
understanding their 
entrepreneurial 
strategies. 
President 
 
 
 
 
Interest in 
developing the 
right formula and 
people to 
effectively run 
these businesses 
Interest in keeping 
complexities of 
retail business to 
minimum 
Accepting the added 
complexity and 
resources to develop 
an effective 
franchise   
Allowing cost,  time, 
development  and 
monitoring of people, 
systems and controls 
VP Finance/IT 
 
 
 
Interest in 
overcoming legal 
and liability 
barriers  
Interest in 
protecting 
business structure 
against costly 
risks 
Interest in reducing 
the risk to the 
company 
Develop a phased in 
approach to 
understand 
legal/financial issues 
VP Operations/ 
R&D 
 
 
 
Interest in 
developing 
products to 
enhance franchise 
image and sell 
through  
Match with 
required 
preferences 
None None 
VP Sales & 
Marketing 
 
 
 
 
Interest in building 
brand image and 
supporting multi 
facet advertising 
campaigns 
Interest in 
supporting MC 
dealers to push 
Regency sales 
Need an interest in 
servicing two 
distinct retail 
models 
Creating additional 
components in 
marketing structure 
and focus.  Need time 
to develop strategies. 
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3.3.1.1.1    Gaps in Management Objectives 
Although this strategic alternative is within preference of our Founder and CEO, 
the majority of the management team interviewed showed caution to pursue the franchise 
model at full speed.  There was a common feeling that the impact of developing a 
franchise would conflict with the primary focus of the current business model.  
Moreover, there is a lack of experience and expertise with franchising among the 
management team.  In discussion with the management team, they do not wish to 
facilitate the more extensive staffing demands necessary to support an entire franchise 
system at this time.   
Regency’s Founder and CEO has stated an ongoing concern with finding the 
“formula” and the right people to run these franchises.  Franchisees tend to be of an 
entrepreneurial nature and Regency, being an entrepreneurial company, would have to let 
go of control to some extent.   This is typically not in Regency’s preference.   Strict 
controls and monitoring would need to be facilitated in order to ensure consistency and 
quality of the stores.  Regency’s management team feels the necessary resources are not 
available and already feel stretched with responsibilities and initiatives related to the 
current business model. 
As stated above, the management team including the Founder and CEO feel that a 
Regency franchise concept and the required systems are not yet understood.  They would 
prefer to somehow experiment a concept store and system first before committing 
resources to the franchise model.  
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The management team feels the increased complexities with state and provincial 
regulatory laws makes this strategic alternative challenging for Regency.   Again, this is 
mostly due to the lack of available resources and knowledge currently in the company to 
deal with the complex process, systems, recruitment and training in developing the 
franchise model.    
 
3.3.1.1.2   Suggested Gap-Bridging Solution 
Regency’s Founder and CEO has expressed much passion and vision for this 
alternative.  As a true entrepreneur, he feels the franchise model is a viable and industry 
changing venture.    He is not ready to commit large resources (either human or financial) 
to this alternative, but rather look for opportunity to experiment with different concepts of 
what a Regency franchise may look like.   
The management team agrees and feels the company does not have the required 
resources or expertise at this time to implement this strategic alternative.   They feel this 
alternative, if executed too fast, would pose risk to the company in terms of financial 
health, undercutting the existing dealer network and complicating the business structure. 
Regency prefers an incremental approach to the change process so as to gain an 
understanding of franchise system.   With there being a clear lack of expertise with 
franchising, the management team would prefer to develop the concept and system 
through leveraging opportunities in the existing dealer network.   There are two observed 
approaches to achieve this and with fifteen hundred dealers currently in Regency’s 
network, these opportunities exist.    
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These “experiment” opportunities could be deemed as the “Franchise Feasibility 
Analysis Phase” (Murphy, 2008) to really ask the question; has our franchise concept 
been sufficiently proven in the marketplace?  These limited franchise experiments, that 
will facilitate proving a franchise concept while keeping risk low, will be called the “Key 
Dealer Plus” model and the “Targeted Dealer” model. 
The “Key Dealer Plus” model is structured to identify opportunities to assist 
struggling retailers and/or disgruntled retailers due to problematic manufacturers.  
Regency would assist in securing lease-hold retail space from multi-competitor retailers.  
By owning the lease, Regency will have control over the retail sale process through 
removing competitor’s products from the showroom floor creating Regency exclusivity.  
Figure 3.0 shows the financial investment details including sales plan, gross margin 
(G/M) and return for both the dealer business and the incremental business for Regency. 
 
Figure 3.0:  Leasehold Opportunity Investment and Return 
 
(Source:  Data from VP Finance, CFO, Regency Fireplace Products, 2011) 
           Key Dealer Plus Model Potential Dealer Business (3yr)
($000s) Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Total
Identify with the MC dealer network Units 200 250 300 750
struggling dealers Sales $900 $1,100 $1,300 $3,300
struggling manufacturers G/M (40%) $360 $435 $510 $1,305
disgruntaled dealers Profit (45%) $30 $45 $60 $135
* Assist in locating and/or securing lease Regency Incremental Business (3yr)
  of retail location in ket location ($000s) Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Total
  (2,000 sq.ft location ideal) Units 200 250 300 750
* Seasonal rental assistance (if required) Revenue $360 $450 $540 $1,350
* Company formation/setup guidance G/M (40%) $175 $215 $260 $650
* Assist in showroom design/layout and Each new location to sell 300 units/year, $540K revenue, $260K margin
   build out
* Provide showroom units at no cost
* Business development funds and Regency Investment of $100K
   marketing assistance ($50K reno's/support, $50K display units)
Positive returns after one year
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The “Targeted Dealer” model is structured toward the non-Regency dealer who 
wants to sell his/her business but lacks the know-how and/or financial resources to do so.  
Regency would assist in the financing (buying/selling process) to facilitate an effective 
succession plan for the exiting owner and the new owner.  This model would include the 
components of the “Key Dealer Plus” and would give Regency control over the selling 
process, showroom contents and product exclusivity.  Figure 3.1 shows the valuation 
(buy-out price), 5 year term loan, interest cost, gross margin (G/M) at 300 unit sales per 
year, and return for Regency. 
 
Figure 3.1:  Hearth Dealer Succession Plan Investment and Return 
 
(Source:  Data from VP Finance, CFO, Regency Fireplace Products, 2011) 
 
 
 
   Targeted Dealer (non-Regency) Estimated Dealer VALUATIONS (buy-out price)
* Hearth retailer succession planning
Low Case        
(C Dealer)
Base Case    
(B Dealer)
High Case      
(A Dealer) *
  (assist in current owner divestment)
200 
($900K)
250 
($1,100)
300 
($1,300)
$30 $45 $60 
* Find targeted locations $60 $90 $120 
$70 $113 $150 
* Choosing new Owner/Manager is key * Assume business inventory = debt (net $nil additional cost).
(where new owner as little financing/credit) Value ranges from $120K to $150K
75% Regency FINANCING ($150K Loan)
($000s) Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 5 Years
* Regency financing to help new owner to 
Loan Balance 
(pay $3/mth) $150 $122 $94 $64 $33 
0%   
PAID
Interest cost     
(% i rate)
$7.5         
(5.0%)
$6.7        
(5.5%)
$5.6            
(6.0%)
$4.2           
(6.5%)
$2.3           
(7.0%)
$26
Regency G/M      $260 $260 $260 $260 $260 $1,300
Each new location to sell 300 units/year, $540K revenue, $260K margin
**  Implement Key Dealer Plus Model Regency Investment of $200K
Positive returns after one year
(Net $1.1M to Regency after 5 years)
($000s)
aquire business (ex. 75%/25%) for 5 years  
(lock-in dealer) 
Units                                              
($Sales)
EBITDA (Profit)
Valuation (2.0x EBITDA)*
Valuation (2.5x EBITDA)*
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Both of these opportunities would bring Regency product exclusivity, control of 
the complete selling process and the ability to experiment with a low-risk model to help 
develop the franchise concept and system.  In time and when a repeatable formula is 
developed, these initial experiment stores would be rolled over into Regency franchises.  
It is important for Regency to develop a solid foundation from the beginning.   A 
determination needs to be made whether franchising ideas should be pursued, postponed 
or abandoned and, assuming these experimental opportunities are showing a positive 
result, what would need to be fine-tuned.  
Both of the pilot project opportunities above would need to be identified within 
the market and selected carefully.  In discussion with the VP of Sales and Marketing, the 
identification could be facilitated by existing Sales Directors and Account Executives in 
their respective regions with no extra human resources required. 
Regency is willing to put forward up to $100K - $200K per opportunity as they 
feel this experimental process is a lower financial risk then pushing too fast with an un-
proven franchise model.    As well, with expected product sell through, positive returns 
would be expected after one year.  If the franchise concept were not to materialize, 
Regency maintains good position and returns from these retail stores while maintaining 
control and product exclusivity. 
 
3.3.1.2    Management Experience 
In Strategic Alternative #2, the management team’s experience will require 
thorough understanding of Regency, the hearth industry, the state of the existing dealer 
network, and potential markets where franchise opportunity exists.   Regency’s Founder 
71 
 
and CEO and the rest of the management team will need the ability to assess certain 
opportunities that may put Regency in a high risk position and/or put Regency’s existing 
dealer network in threat. 
But more importantly, the management team, or some representation of the 
management team, will need a full understanding of how franchises work and how they 
are developed. Regency must realize that planning to franchise is like entering a new 
business with new customers (business owners-operators).  This new business will 
require skills, abilities and expertise in sales training, technical training, market support 
and financial/accounting assistance.  It will be critical to have experience in developing 
effective evaluation, documentation, mentoring, training and consulting. 
From a legal, regulation and protection perspective, experience is required with 
franchise documents such as the Franchise Disclosure Document (FDD), Training 
Program Curriculum, Franchise Operations Manual and Franchise Registration 
Application that are required in many states and provinces. 
Table 3.2 below summarizes the required preferences and compares to the 
preferences that are observed amongst the key decision-makers for Regency. 
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Table 3.2:  Management Experience Under Strategic Alternative #2 
Management 
Subject 
Required 
Preferences 
Observed  
Preferences 
Major Gaps Gap-Closing 
Analysis 
Founder and 
CEO 
 
 
 
 
Experience in 
franchising a well 
established  
business 
Growing 
knowledge of 
franchise concept 
and vision, with 
expertise in the 
hearth industry 
and customer 
experience. 
Full understanding 
of developing a 
successful franchise 
Seek professional 
assistance regarding 
setting up and 
developing a 
franchised business 
President 
 
 
 
 
Expertise in 
managing a 
franchised 
business model 
Experience in 
sales and 
marketing, with a 
detailed 
understanding of 
the dealer network 
Understanding the 
dynamics of both 
businesses 
Develop the ability 
to focus on the 
franchise business 
network through 
hiring a Director of 
Franchise 
Development   
VP Finance/IT 
 
 
 
Experience to 
facilitate 
legal/financial 
assistance 
Match to required 
preferences 
None None 
VP Operations/ 
R&D 
 
 
 
Expertise to 
respond to 
customer needs 
quickly by 
effectively 
deploying 
resources 
Match to required 
preferences 
None None 
VP Sales & 
Marketing 
 
 
 
 
Experience to 
develop custom 
marketing 
Programs as per 
franchise needs 
Match to required 
preferences 
None None 
 
 
3.3.1.2.1    Gaps in Management Experience 
As shown in Table 3.2, only the VP of Finance/IT, the VP of Sales and Marketing 
and the VP of Operations/R&D required preferences in management experience match 
those observed.   The majority of the current management team has been in the hearth 
industry and/or working with Regency for 15-20 years.  Still being very engaged with his 
company, Regency’s Founder and CEO has 35 years of experience in the hearth industry.   
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Regency has a vast cross-section of experience across all aspects of the industry, dealer 
network, marketing, product design and financial and legal.   
However, the primary gaps in management experience are observed to be those 
revolving around franchise business development.  Although, some research has observed 
to be done by the management team, specifically the Founder and CEO, a firm 
understanding of what makes a franchise business model successful is still in question.  
Without this knowledge, commitment and focus to plan, set-up, execute and develop a 
franchised business, Regency may have serious challenges with success. 
 
3.3.1.2.2   Suggested Gap-Building Solution 
The experience required for Strategic Alternative #2 to be successful is critical.  
There needs to be focus and expertise placed on strategic franchise planning to manage 
the current and future franchise effort.   In question is the current level of experience and 
time resources required to make this happen.  In order to bridge this gap, it is 
recommended the Regency needs a senior manager or director in charge of franchise 
business development.   This senior position would oversee, facilitate and manage all 
aspects of franchise planning, development, audit and performance of the current and 
future franchise locations.  Ideally, this senior manager would hold a high level of hearth 
industry experience and work directly with the senior management team.  This position 
salary approximately is observed in the $130K - $160K/year base, plus bonuses and 
benefit package. 
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3.3.1.3    Management Team 
The Founder and CEO of Regency is a creative entrepreneur who generates many 
ideas and strategic concepts toward his management team.    He holds much respect for 
his team’s experience and delegates as such. 
Strategic Alternative #2 will required a complete team effort of brainstorming and 
consensus building in order to assess and execute opportunities in developing the 
Regency franchising model. 
Table 3.3 below summarizes how this compares to the preferences that are 
observed amongst the key decision-makers for Regency. 
 
Table 3.3:  Management Team Under Strategic Alternative #2 
Management 
Subject 
Required 
Preferences 
Observed  
Preferences 
Major Gaps Gap-Closing 
Analysis 
Founder and 
CEO 
Ability to 
delegate and 
allow team 
autonomy 
Match with 
required 
preferences 
None None 
President 
 
 
 
 
Ability to 
facilitate to 
consensus among 
team 
Match with 
required 
preferences,  
However concise 
team decisions not 
always reached 
Decisions are 
sometimes left on 
the table, with no 
immediate 
resolution 
Deploy existing 
human resources for 
recommendations.  
Put in place an 
experienced manager 
in charge of 
franchise 
development 
decisions 
VP Finance/IT Ability to work 
productively with 
team 
Match with 
required 
preferences 
None None 
VP Operations/ 
R&D 
Ability to work 
productively with 
team  
Match with 
required 
preferences 
None None 
VP Sales & 
Marketing 
Ability to work 
productively with 
team  
Match to required 
preferences 
None None 
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3.3.1.3.1    Gaps in Management Team 
For the most part all of the required preferences in management team match those 
observed.   The management team at Regency holds a high level of experience and 
opinion and generally embraces change well.   However, because of this dynamic, 
reaching a consensus is sometimes a challenge.  
With the complexity and detailed requirements of planning and developing a 
franchised business, decision making relating to this venture could be challenging for the 
existing management team.   When a decision is imminent and a consensus cannot be 
made, Regency’s President will need to make a concise decision to settle the matter and 
ensure opportunity does not pass itself by due to disagreement.   
 
3.3.1.3.2    Suggested Gap-Bridging Solution 
As opportunities arise in the market to execute Strategic Alternative #2 (including 
the two experimental franchise models described in Management Objectives section 
3.3.1.1), thorough assessment followed by timely decision making will need to take 
place.   The high level of personal opinion held by the management team may need to be 
managed so a final decision can be made.  It is important to note that high level strategic 
decisions in Regency are dealt with on a consensus basis within the entire management 
team.   However, by using Regency’s existing regional Sales Directors to make initial 
decisions and recommendations would be in Regency’s best interest.  These Directors 
could be deployed to manage the front line opportunities in the existing dealer network 
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for the franchise feasibility analysis phase, as stated in Management Objectives section 
3.3.1.1, and bring detailed analysis and recommendation to senior management.   
However, in light of the attention and understanding required to make the 
franchise business successful, and as stated in Management Experience section 3.4.1.2, 
Regency should consider adding, or promoting from within, a senior manager in charge 
of franchise business development.   The challenge is finding a person with a balance of 
franchise and hearth industry experience.  This manager would ultimately report into the 
VP of Sales and Marketing and be charged with responsibility for franchise related 
decisions making. 
 
3.3.1.4   Leadership 
In Strategic Alternative #2, the leadership required will need to be one of allowing 
others to make the necessary changes and decisions to achieve the common goal set out.  
This alternative will require initiative, perseverance and commitment.   The management 
team will need to be on the same page and show confidence and passion in their actions 
and how they relate to the franchise opportunities, systems and support.  Effective 
leadership in planning and developing the franchise business will need to be consistent 
and focused, without being influenced by other agendas or initiatives within the 
company. 
This strategic alternative will require leaders with the ability to balance the 
business between existing MC dealers and franchised stores.   The leadership needs to 
ensure clear direction and vision are supported with both retail strategies to avoid 
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confusion among those supporting each.  For example, a new product design, consuming 
R&D resources, may only be in development exclusively for the franchise business. 
 
3.3.1.4.1    Gaps in Leadership 
In discussion with the management team, they feel the Founder and CEO is a true 
entrepreneurial leader who trusts and gives them the autonomy required in order for them 
to be good leaders of change.   Although, the management team holds slightly differing 
leadership styles, they all believe that Regency is a performance driven company and as 
such lead their respective teams accordingly.   
Each respective member of the management team currently supplies effective 
leadership and decision making within their areas of responsibility.   These areas of 
responsibility currently cater, on the most part, to the MC dealer network.   The 
leadership to develop the franchise business is currently non-existent.  This is the primary 
gap in achieving success with Strategic Alternative #2.  Decision making and direction 
need to be clear among Regency employees and ensuring there is the necessary 
separation between the MC dealer and the franchise business. 
As observed and mentioned earlier, Regency’s Founder and CEO has been 
researching the viability of franchising for his business.  However, in the long run, he 
would not be the one to supply day to day leadership and decision making in this venture.  
Decision making with regards to the franchise business will need a dedicated leadership 
role. 
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3.3.1.4.2    Suggested Gap-Bridging Solution 
Regency continues to hold strong management and leadership capabilities.  
However, in order to bridge the gap of not having dedicated leadership and decision 
making for Strategic Alternative #2, Regency would be best to hire, develop, and/or 
promote a manager or director responsible for this alternative as stated in section 3.3.1.3 
Management Team. 
In the short run, Regency’s Founder and CEO should hold a high level of 
involvement in the concept and vision of the franchise business.  However, in the long 
run, once a formula is developed and proven, the franchise business will need to be the 
responsibility of an executive team member.  This will facilitate clear direction and 
decision making with focus on expanding the franchised stores across North America. 
 
3.3.1.5    Management Preference Summary 
The analysis of Management Preferences indicates that there are nine gaps that 
need to be filled.  It is to be noticed that there is one common gap that appeared in 
management objectives, management experience and leadership with regards to 
experience and leadership with franchise business development.  The following is the 
summary of the gaps indentified: 
 
• Maintain a consistent franchise image with multiple business owners 
• Accepting added complexity to business 
• Interest in reducing risk to company 
• Interest in marketing to two distinct retail models 
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• Understanding franchise business development  
• Understanding dynamics of two business models; MC dealer and franchise 
• Distinct product development expertise for franchise model 
• Decision making left on table 
• Lacking long term leadership with franchise development 
 
Table 3.4 below summarizes the suggested methods to fill these gaps: 
 
Table 3.4:  Summary of Management Preference Gaps and Suggested Solutions for 
Strategic Alternative #2 
 
Gap Suggested Solution 
Maintain a consistent franchise image with 
multiple business owners 
Develop a proven “formula” and careful 
selection of franchisees 
Accepting added complexity to business 
 
Allowing cost, time and development of people, 
systems and controls to control complexity 
Interest in reducing risk to company 
 
Develop a phase in approach to understand 
legal/financial issues and constraints using 
experimental franchise stores: 
“Key Dealer Plus” and/or “Targeted Dealer” 
Interest in marketing to two distinct retail 
models 
 
Create additional components in marketing 
structure/focus and develop strategies for both 
models 
Understanding franchise business development  
 
Initially seek professional assistance regarding 
franchise planning/development 
Understanding dynamics of two business 
models; MC dealer and franchise 
 
Develop ability to focus on franchise business 
network through hiring a senior manager in 
charge of franchise development 
Distinct product development expertise for 
franchise model 
 
Ensure clarity and develop or find experience in 
design concepts and project scope for niche 
(franchised) applications 
Decision making left on table 
 
Deploy existing human resources for 
opportunity recommendations.  Place an 
experienced discipline in charge of franchise 
development decisions 
Lacking long term leadership with franchise 
development 
 
Short run: Founder and CEO to supply vision.  
Long run: senior executive team member to 
supply direction and decisions for the franchise 
business 
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It is important to note that Strategic Alternative #2, as it was explained in Chapter 
2 as the Regency Franchise, has been significantly modified to reduce the risk to 
Regency.  Again, due to Regency’s lack of franchise experience, experimental franchise 
stores will pose as a feasibility study in developing the “right” franchise concept and 
formula.  
 
3.2.2    Organization Analysis 
3.3.2.1    Systems 
In order for Strategic Alternative #2 to be successful, many systems need to be 
developed, proven, implemented, monitored and adjusted as required.  The key is having 
these systems well defined and understood before attempting to develop a franchise 
program.  A successful franchise development program begins with a solid foundation 
(Murphy, 2008).  The long-term goal is to establish balanced, integrated and successful 
business relationships with qualified individuals (owners) who support Regency’s goals 
and image.  From the franchisee’s perspective, they risk their capital because of their 
confidence in Regency’s products and proven systems.  Creating these relationships 
requires a comprehensive strategy that addresses all aspects of the franchise venture. 
The danger here is allowing franchise consultants and/or franchise legal services 
to deliver “cookie cutter” systems and documents for the franchisor to use.  In this case, 
these documents would be generated by feedback from Regency, who at this point, has 
minimal knowledge of franchising a business.  Yet, Regency would be charged with 
making all the strategic decisions.  Regency needs to be very aware of this and ensure 
they undertake well thought-out strategic planning and systems before they enter the 
franchise industry. 
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A good strategic plan for franchise systems should be approached as a team effort 
between the Regency’s management and any outside consultants and legal professionals.   
Table 3.5 summarizes the basic elements of the strategic planning systems for a 
franchisable business (Canada Business, 1999). 
 
Table 3.5:  Summary of Systems Required for a Franchisable Business 
Elements of Systems  Description 
Franchise operations Defines the franchisor’s program for each step of the franchise 
relationship 
Operational format Defines the relationship between the company and its franchise 
distribution systems 
Manuals and training Determines the correct structure and language for procedural and 
operational manuals and training 
Retailing  Defines the retail operating system including standards, 
inventory, marketing, advertising, loss prevention 
Development 
 
Prioritizes the goals for an effective growth program 
Franchisee selection  Determines the franchisee recruitment and selection process.  
Market selection, entry, and distribution 
Royalties/fees Determines projected growth rate for the franchise business 
including financial projections and start-up costs, royalty fees, 
advertising contribution 
Technical  Define technical training specifications, execution and frequency 
i.e.: new product introductions 
 
 
A good franchise concept has to be teachable.  To accomplish this, Regency’s 
franchise model should be thoroughly systemized and its operations documented so it can 
be copied by others.  Moreover, the [franchised] business must be able to operate in a 
non-centralized way.  An effective method to document operations is in a franchise 
operations manual.    These manuals reflect standardized methods, processes and 
procedures for every facet of the franchised business.  The franchise operations manual 
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becomes a training program for owners, managers and employees and can be used for 
audit purposes from the franchisor. 
A major reason for solid and standardized systems is the concept of repeatability.  
Repeatability is the essence of a franchisable business and therefore the business must be 
one that can be replicated over and over in many places by many people.   It is important 
to note for Regency, that if their “formula” and system can only work in one location or 
one narrow geographical region, it is not repeatable and therefore not franchisable.  
Technical training systems will be critical for Alternative #2 to be successful.  
New owners/managers will need industry expertise knowledge transfer for design, 
application, install and service perspectives.  These systems could range from training 
workshops to webinars to instructional web-based videos and must be frequent enough 
and stay abreast with new product development and introductions. 
As much as technical service systems are important, sales and marketing training 
systems and advertising support will be required to ensure product utility benefits are 
passed to the consumer so as to generate a greater willingness to pay.  This in conjunction 
with exceptional product development will capture the economic surplus for Regency, as 
described earlier. 
 
3.3.2.1.1    Gaps in Systems 
Regency has developed strong and stable business systems over their evolution.  
Specifically, since 2004, Regency has successfully adopted a continuous improvement 
mindset of identifying and removing no-valued added activity based on cross-functional 
problem solving and solution implementation.  The basis for this mindset is through 
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process mapping current state activity and conducting gap analysis against a desired 
future state.  This mindset will assist Regency in developing effective franchise systems 
going forward. 
However, there is a known gap in Regency’s IT systems with their Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) computer system.  This system, originally implemented in 
2003, is a single database for sales, operations, distribution and finance transactions and 
information across North America.  It has been observed through 3rd party auditing and 
employee survey that the system has reached its lifespan because the technology and 
functionality are antiquated and will not allow future flexibility, visibility, integration and 
growth through-out Regency’s supply chain.  Newer systems available are designed to 
deliver fully integrated information and process visibility across an organizations supply 
chain.  These newer systems can facilitate real time information right through planning, 
procurement, manufacturing, distribution, retail and after sale service. 
Regency continues to be an industry leader in customer service in terms of 
technical before and after sale service and training as well as sales and marketing support.   
This is currently what differentiates Regency in the industry and they need to ensure 
these systems stay abreast of market shifts, changing needs and opportunities.  No gaps 
are identified here as it is observed that Regency’s customer service abilities will in fact 
be a driving asset to developing the franchise business. 
However, Regency currently has no systems in place related to setting up or 
developing, selecting, servicing and monitoring the franchisees.  These systems are all 
the procedures that become the franchise operations manual and cover everything from 
startup activities to marketing, office procedures and personnel management.   The gap 
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here is in Regency having the technical writing skills to create these procedures in order 
to ensure they are effective, clearly understandable and repeatable.  This operations 
(systems) manual will be the standard for which monitoring, auditing and performance 
measurement will be based off.  Moreover, control systems such as mystery shoppers and 
integrated point-of-sale (POS) devices will need to be put in place to monitor the 
franchisees activity and commitment to Regency products.  
 
3.3.2.1.2    Suggested Gap-Bridging Solution 
In order to close this gap with the IT systems, Regency would need to implement 
or upgrade a better ERP solution with the focus on improving the supply chain 
effectiveness, specifically downstream from their manufacturing operations, through 
distribution and into the retail store.  In discussion with Regency’s President and VP of 
Finance/IT, this ERP implementation is currently being planned for a 2nd quarter of 2013 
go-live.   This IT solution will allow Regency to achieve improved work-flow, better 
visibility of real time information and enable a fully integrated supply chain through its 
distribution and into the franchised business. 
Regency, although holding depth of skills and experience in the hearth industry, 
will need assistance with developing proper documents and procedures that make up the 
franchise operations systems manual.  By acquiring the skills of technical writers, in 
conjunction with an experienced franchise attorney and a competent franchise consultant, 
these procedures can be constructed so they are easy to read and satisfy all legal 
requirements.  This experience, to render the services required in developing the 
franchise operations manual are estimated to cost $60K. 
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3.3.2.2    Structure 
One of the reasons to develop a franchised business is to maintain Regency’s 
differentiation strategy and this is best achieved through a decentralized structure.  
Having regional decision making, sales and technical training and support and product 
availability will allow Regency to enhance their differentiation strategy at the franchise 
level.  Because each region has differing customer needs in terms of product offering, 
maintaining regional focus will benefit the customer, store owner/manager and Regency.    
In terms of supporting the distribution and logistics for North American 
franchises, Regency’s head office and manufacturing and their six sales and distribution 
branches, will need clarity with reporting structure.  Roles and responsibilities across the 
organization in the areas of sales, marketing, distribution and manufacturing will need 
review to ensure consistency with objectives and service to all regional areas supporting 
the franchised business. 
A more direct focus on the franchise business and network is important to 
mitigate any crossed-agendas between the MC dealer business and the franchise business.   
These two distinct retail strategies have differing systems and tactics.   The franchise 
business as it develops and stabilizes will continue to need a well defined structure 
supporting it.  However, it is important to note that the longer a particular franchisee is in 
operation, the less support it should require from the franchisor. 
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3.3.2.2.1    Gaps in Structure 
The gaps in structure stem from having the sales and distribution branches 
reporting respectively into Regency’s Sales Directors.  There are six decentralized 
structures like this existing in Regency today and these sales and distribution entities 
report into Regency’s VP of Sales and Marketing.   Figure 3.2 shows the current 
organizational chart with respect to sales and distribution structure. 
 
Figure 3.2:  Organization Chart for Current Sales and Distribution Structure  
 
 
As can be seen from the existing organizational structure, there is gap with having 
no organizational focus on the franchise business.  There are broken links between 
manufacturing (supply) and distribution and this fragmented organizational structure is 
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causing ineffective product allocation decision making from supply to retail.  As well, in 
a discussion with Regency’s President, there is a concern over lack of presence and 
effectiveness with the Sales structure of the company.   This structure will clearly be of 
prime importance in scanning and locating opportunities for developing and expanding 
the “experimental franchise” stores and the full Regency franchise. 
 
3.3.2.2.2    Suggested Gap-Bridging Solution 
The suggested gap-bridging solutions for improving the structure effectiveness is 
to develop distinct organizational structure focuses, linking manufacturing, distribution, 
sales and marketing to the retail showroom floor.   The suggested solutions are as 
follows: 
 
• Re-structure the distribution branches by removing the direct responsibilities 
away from the Sales Directors and putting them under Operations; 
• Re-structure the Sales and Marketing structure, having the re-structured Sales 
Directors full focus on their sales teams, MC dealers network and initial pilot 
opportunities in assisting with developing the franchise business; 
• Put in position a Director of Franchise Development reporting in to VP Sales and 
Marketing in charge of franchise business, systems, planning and development; 
• Create a VP Supply Chain position, having the responsibility of all manufacturing 
and distribution operations across North America.  This will build better focus to 
improve systems, efficiencies, inventory management and allocation to service 
entire retail network. 
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Expected costs to Regency would be incremental as business development grows.  
In observation, the existing Director of Manufacturing position is poised to assume the 
VP Supply Chain responsibilities and the needed Director of Franchise Development 
could be potentially filled through consolidating existing Sales Director positions.    
Figure 3.3 shows the future organizational chart with respect to the Sales and 
Distribution structure. 
 
Figure 3.3:  Organizational Chart for Future Sales and Distribution Structure
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3.3.2.3    Organizational Culture 
For Strategic Alternative #2, the culture of Regency at the senior management 
level needs to be one of respectful dialogue, discussion and autonomy.   The management 
team needs to have the ability to listen to others, brainstorm and allow ideas to live.   
As many issues regarding the industry, competitors and tactical measures will 
come into play, these team members all need to be able to listen to middle management 
regarding opportunities in the market and more specifically the owners/managers of the 
retail stores.  Regency will have to create a mechanism for the franchisees to supply input 
and feedback regarding product and customer information.  
This environment must flow down to all functional areas and employees in order 
for the organization to hold an acceptable level of authenticity.   Only then, will Regency 
be able to capitalize on strategic change through buy-in and commitment from others. 
 
3.3.2.3.1    Gaps in Organizational Culture 
As a true entrepreneurial company with decentralized decision making and 
autonomy, Regency is observed to fit the culture needed for franchising.    Regency has a 
continuous improvement culture, where all employees are encouraged to challenge the 
status quo and identify opportunities for required change.  Change is accepted freely, yet 
if of a strategic nature, is typically discussed among the senior management team to a 
decision that is best of the company as a whole.   This is how strategic change is looked 
at from the senior management level.   Respect and understanding of each other’s 
viewpoints is apparent and visible.   With the careful selection of franchisees, and in 
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discussion with the Founder and CEO, Regency hopes to maintain this culture.  With the 
right franchisees in place, Regency hopes to capture the direct customer needs and allow 
the franchisee a voice and give input back to head office to improve product, service and 
systems.  This can be achieved through having a direct structure and discipline supporting 
the franchise business, as stated in preceding sections.  There are no visible gaps 
currently observed with regards to organizational culture.   
 
3.3.2.4    Organization Summary 
The analysis of the Organization indicates that there are four main gaps that need 
to be filled: 
• IT systems, specifically their Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) computer 
system is hampering flexibility and growth.  
• Control systems for developing, selecting and monitoring franchisee activity. 
• No technical writing skills to create franchise business procedures in order to 
ensure they are effective, clearly understandable and repeatable.   
• No organizational structure focused on the franchise business. 
o Reporting structure of distribution branches into Sales Directors 
o Concern over lack of presence and effectiveness with the Sales 
structure of the company 
The suggested ways to fill these gaps are summarized in Table 3.6 below. 
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Table 3.6: Summary of Organization Gaps and Suggested Solutions for Strategic  
                 Alternative #2 
 
 
Gap Suggested Solution Estimated Cost 
IT systems, specifically their 
Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) computer system is 
hampering flexibility and 
growth 
 
Need to implement or upgrade a 
better ERP solution with the 
focus on improving the supply 
chain effectiveness, specifically 
upstream from their 
manufacturing operations, 
through distribution and into the 
retail store.* 
$800K - $1M for complete 
system and 
implementation 
 
*strategic alternative #2 
does not require this, but 
will enhance its success 
No technical writing skills to 
create franchise business 
procedures and control systems 
in order to ensure they are 
effective, clearly 
understandable, repeatable and 
legal 
 
Acquire the skills of technical 
writer, in conjunction with an 
experienced franchise attorney 
and a competent franchise 
consultant 
Up front, one-time cost of  
$60K to complete 
franchise operations 
manual, documentation 
and control systems 
Control systems for monitoring 
franchisee activity 
 
Integrated POS devices and use 
Regency’s regional employees 
as mystery shoppers 
Use ERP computer system 
integrated functionality to 
see real time sales data 
No organizational structure 
focused on franchise business 
Re-direct the responsibilities of 
the distribution warehouses 
away from the Sales Directors 
and create a Supply Chain 
Management function. 
Additional $50K per year 
in salary and bonuses 
Consolidate Sales Directors and 
create a Director of Franchise 
Development 
Additional $50K per year 
in salary and bonuses 
 
 
3.3.3    Resources Analysis 
3.3.3.1    Operational Resources 
For Strategic Alternative #2 to be successful, well established yet flexible 
operational resources will need to be in place.   These resources include R&D capabilities 
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to develop and maintain a breadth and depth of product line enough to enhance and 
differentiate the franchise business. 
.  Minimal inventory at the franchisee level is critical for profitability and lower 
risk.   Therefore, the distribution system, for Strategic Alternative #2, would need focus 
to supply on an “on-demand” basis into the retail store with minimal lead times.  Product 
supply (manufacturing and procurement) into finished goods distribution would need to 
be flexible, agile and have the ability to be responsive to consumer demands. 
As opportunity arises to expand the franchise and maintain consistent customer 
service, a strong capability with sales and technical training and support would be 
required to bring store managers and staff to a high quality level of customer service.  As 
new products enter the market the franchisees must stay abreast of the technology and 
functionality.  Other important operational resource capabilities in order to support 
Strategic Alternative #2 would be infrastructure to offer financial services, business 
development assistance and marketing programs. 
 
3.3.3.1.1    Gaps in Operational Resources 
Most current capabilities in operational resources match those required to make 
Strategic Alternative #2 successful.      In observation and discussion with the 
management team, Regency has strong operational resources across the company.   All 
R&D and product development personal within Regency and supporting resources 
outside Regency have strong skills and experience in hearth design, prototyping, testing 
and approval process.   
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Regency has developed an efficient manufacturing plant built on the philosophy 
of agility, flexibility and responsiveness to changing market demands.   This coupled 
with six wholly owned distribution centers throughout North America allows efficient 
movement of product to the marketplace. 
Each decentralized distribution center, strategically located across North America, 
is fully capable of supplying sales and technical training in order to support a franchised 
retail network.    Each distribution center has the current ability and resources to deploy 
the technical training internally or externally.   Moreover, IT development is assisting in 
this ability through web-based sales assistance and technical training and instructional 
videos. 
Regency, over the years, has maintained a healthy and strong financial position.  
Strong knowledge and experience along with a commitment to Regency’s business model 
from all the management team is the primary reason for this.  Financial resources at 
Regency include IT and legal entities.  It is agreed, from the Regency’s Founder and 
CEO and the VP of Finance, that this knowledge and support could be deployed to bring 
solid business development assistance to opportunities within Strategic Alternative #2.  
There are no observed gaps in Regency’s operational resources. 
 
3.3.3.2    Human Resources 
For Strategic Alternative #2 to succeed, Regency will require a strong senior 
management team across all functional areas.    As well, industry specific skills and 
experience in marketing, sales and technical training would be of prime importance.   In 
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looking for the “right” people to run these franchises, Regency should look at its 
employee base for future franchise owner/operators as a viable option. 
For this to be possible, Regency may need to look into HR systems to develop 
potential franchise operators.   The advantage here is having personnel that understands 
the Regency culture and preferably has grown with the company to understand its 
products and differentiation.  Regency would need to develop career planning and 
succession planning development programs to advance skill sets and readiness for the 
franchise business.   
 
3.3.3.2.1    Gaps in Human Resources 
Regency has a strong senior management team with 15-20 years with the 
organization and/or the hearth industry.  The depth of employees under the management 
team shares the same level of respective knowledge, specialization and tenure.  
Regency’s retention rate is high with 60% of their staff employees being with the 
company for an average of 13 years and 60% of that group have been with Regency for 
an average of 20 years.  As observed in annual employee surveys the level of Regency 
employees that are committed to the organization and wanting to contribute to its success 
is high. 
However, there are observed gaps in leveraging this experience and commitment 
with respect to career development and skill building for potential owner/operators for a 
franchised store.   In observation and discussions, many of Regency employees show 
interest in this opportunity to become a business owner, operator or manager of a 
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Regency franchise.   Their years of knowledge and understanding of Regency culture 
could be, with proper training and development, easily transferable to the retail level. 
 
3.3.3.2.2    Suggested Gap-Bridging Solution 
In order to bridge the gap stated above, and improve the success of Strategic 
Alternative #2, Regency will need to look at creating career development programs 
focusing on the skills in becoming a franchise owner or manager.  This program would 
allow selected employees the opportunity to advance their prospective entrepreneurial 
careers, yet stay within the culture of the company they have grown with. 
This program should be considered an investment to Regency and would run in 
parallel with franchise development.   A program of this nature would yield minimal cost 
and would utilize existing resources in sales, technical, product knowledge and 
Regency’s franchise “formula”.   An estimated cost of $2000 per year per employee 
would be expected. 
 
3.3.3.3    Financial Resources 
The financial resources required for Strategic Alternative #2 can vary depending 
on scale and scope of the franchise business.  For this alternative to be successful, it must 
be recognized that significant financial resources are required for franchise development, 
organizational structure changes/additions and systems implementations.   
Table 3.7 outlines the estimated internal organizational and human resource costs 
required to support the franchise business.  The organizational structure changes are 
estimated as a one-time adjustment to existing employee base salary and bonus structure. 
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Table 3.7:  Organization/Human Resources Costs to Support Strategic Alternative #2 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE CHANGES 
Create VP Supply Chain and Director of Franchise Development from existing human 
resources* 
$100,000 
* one time 
salary 
adjustment 
INTERNAL CAREER DEVELOPMENT 
Skills development for existing employee franchisee potentials (3/yr) 
$6,000/yr 
 
Table 3.8 below outlines the financial budget costs associated with developing a 
franchise (Murphy, 2009).  These are estimated costs and can vary depending on 
expertise and time spent in the planning phase of setting up the franchise. 
 
Table 3.8:  Franchise Development Budget Costs 
STRATEGIC PLANNING, OPERATIONS MANUAL  
& TRAINING PROGRAM      
Months of critical franchise strategic planning, including helping develop a professional, 
customized franchise operations manual and training program that are fully integrated with 
the FDD (below). 
$60,000 
FDD FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE DOCUMENT 
Also includes drafting the FDD Franchise Disclosure Document, a 23-chapter document with 
various exhibits including franchise agreement, audited financial statements 
FRANCHISE REGISTRATION APPLICATION 
Also includes preparing and filing a franchise registration  
application with one franchise registration state. 
ADD NEW ENTITY FORMATION COSTS 
Forming a new entity to offer and sell the franchises   
(Corporation or LLC) 
$2,000 
ADD CPA COST OF AUDITED FINANCIALS FOR FDD 
Cost of audited financials for FDD  
$5,000 
ADD REGISTRATION FILING FEE 
Registration application fee paid to a franchise registration state 
$1,000 
Total Budget to Enter Franchising [1] $68,000 
Additional franchisee follow-up and training $6,000 
 
[1] - does not include whatever amount is used to initially capitalize the new entity at start up, or post-development 
expenses such as franchise advertising and marketing costs. A franchise development program normally takes about 
four to six months to complete and can be expedited even further on a "rush" basis. Review-registration time by 
governmental agencies depends on a variety of factors and will take further time to complete. The estimate includes an 
FDD containing a single unit franchise agreement and filing in one franchise registration state. Using a defined 
franchise budget gets the cost to franchise a business to an acceptable, affordable level and ensures the most efficient 
use of resources and talent. Paying at hourly rates can increase the cost five-fold or more.  
(Source: http://www.franchisefoundations.com/franchisebudget.html) 
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3.3.3.3.3    Gaps in Financial Resources 
In discussion with the Founder/CEO and President of Regency, regarding the 
financial budgets above, they showed acceptance to these initial estimates.   
Understanding that a well run franchise could yield sales revenues of $1.2M per year 
(300 units @ $4,000 retail) at a franchise royalty fee of 4-10% (Siebert, 2010), the 
investment required yields a return that is acceptable to the company. 
As stated in above sections, Regency capital structure yields a strong balance 
sheet and the company has remained profitable over its duration in the hearth industry.  
Financial resources to develop Strategic Alternative #2, whether from the business and/or 
lending institutions, are within the capabilities of Regency.  Based on the observation and 
opinion of senior management, no gaps in financial resources are identified at this time. 
 
3.3.3.4    Resources Summary 
The analysis of the Resources indicates that there are two gaps that need to be 
filled: 
• Ability to supply business development and financial support and assistance to 
potential Regency only retail stores. 
• Re-organization of people and/or departments with regards to manufacturing, 
distribution and sales in order to streamline focuses in the supply chain 
functions. 
The suggested ways to fill these gaps are summarized in Table 3.9 below. 
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Table 3.9: Summary of Resources Gaps and Suggested Solutions for Strategic  
                 Alternative #2 
 
 
Gap Suggested Solution 
Ability to supply business development and 
financial support and assistance to potential 
Regency only retail stores. 
Develop the business development and 
financial resources model that can be deployed 
as needed to the would-be, less experienced 
store managers. 
Re-organization of people and/or departments 
with regards to manufacturing, distribution and 
sales in order to streamline focuses in the 
supply chain functions. 
 
Creating a supply chain focus within the 
company.  New position would ideally be part 
of the senior management team and the 
individual would have the skills and 
experience to make decisions and influence 
change with respect to manufacturing 
operations, inventory systems and distribution 
and logistics. 
 
3.3.4    Summary of Assessment 
The primary reasoning for the strategic alternatives proposed is for Regency to 
obtain a majority control over the complete selling process of its products to 
homeowners.  One of the main objectives is to remove competitors from the showroom 
floor where these sales take place. 
The two proposed alternatives will both satisfy this objective.  However, a risk 
adverse management preference and a long standing successful business model are 
putting the Corporate Owned Retail (Strategic Alternative #1) in a less desirable state.  In 
fact, management stated they would not pursue this alternative. 
Risk adverseness is also affecting the full implementation of the Regency 
Franchise (Strategic Alternative #2).  However, with the needed skills and feasibility 
phase (experimental franchise stores) the Regency Franchise model would be a viable 
strategic alternative in pursuing forward integration.  Depending on the outcome of this 
experimental phase with the “Key Dealer Plus” and “Targeted Dealer” models, Regency 
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could very well be in a position to develop their franchise business.   In making the 
Regency Franchise alternative successful, Regency has various gaps to fill.  However, 
filling these gaps is well within the management preference, organizational capabilities 
and company resources. 
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4: FINAL RECOMMENDATION 
This chapter will summarize the findings, recommend the best alternatives based 
on previous studies, explain the gap bridging solutions, and offer a timeline for strategy 
implementation. 
 
4.1    Summary of the Strategic Alternative 
Based on the analysis of the hearth industry and Regency’s internal capabilities, it 
is suggested the Regency move forward with Strategic Alternative #2, The Regency 
Franchise.   This strategic alternative, in looking back at Table 1.1 and ‘The Strategic 
Grid Fit’, is in keeping with Regency’s differentiation strategy.    
A Regency Franchise model will allow the company to leverage its core 
competencies to gain competitive advantage over its competitors in the hearth industry 
while capturing economic surplus.  Regency’s goal to obtain a more control over the 
complete selling process while creating a unique and consistent customer experience.   
This can be done, while maintaining their low risk profile, through developing a retail 
“formula” that can be repeatable for a franchise model.   
 
4.2    Summary of Phased Action Plan 
To implement the above strategic alternative, Regency has to bridge the gaps 
identified in the areas of management preference, organization capabilities and company 
resources.  In reviewing the Chapter 3 analysis, these gaps can be summarized in four key 
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phases of implementation.  Table 4.0 below, shows the phase, area of interest, action, 
plan and timeframe frame. 
Table 4.0:  The Regency Franchise Phased Implementation Plan 
Phase Interest Action Plan Timeline 
1 
Organizational 
Structure Phase 
Is the 
organization 
structured to 
support the 
franchise? 
Structure  
organization to 
support a 
franchise 
business model  
 
Remove 
distribution 
branches from 
Sales Directors and 
structure a fully 
focused sales team 
 
Move distribution 
branches to a 
supply chain 
management 
responsibility 
 
Q1 – Q2 2012 
 
(March 2012 - 
August 2012) 
2 
 
Franchise 
Feasibility 
Phase 
 
 
 
 
Has the 
concept been 
sufficiently 
proven? 
Create a proven 
“formula” for 
franchising 
 
Leverage existing 
dealer network 
with Regency Key 
Dealer Plus and 
Targeted Dealer 
models – creating 
exclusivity and 
control  
 
Q1 – Q4 2012 
 
(March 2012 – 
February 2013) 
3 
 
Franchise 
Strategic 
Planning Phase 
 
Is there a 
solid 
foundation in 
place for 
franchising? 
Maintain clear 
focus and 
decision making 
with franchise 
development 
 
Hire or promote a 
Director of 
Franchise Business 
Development to 
foster the 
management of the 
franchise business 
Q1 – Q2 2013 
 
March 2013 – 
August 2013) 
4 
 
Franchise 
Documentation  
Phase and 
Launch 
 
Are all the 
required 
systems and 
legal aspects 
in place? 
Understand and 
knowledge to 
develop the 
model and 
launch the 
franchise plan 
Deploy external 
consulting 
expertise to assist 
in bringing 
franchise to market 
Q3 – Q4 2013 
 
(September 2013 
– February 2014) 
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It is important to understand the timeframe above is taking into consideration 
Regency’s current ERP computer system implementation scheduled for a beginning of 
Q2 (June) 2013.  This ERP system implementation is an organization wide initiative and 
will consume human resources into Q3 of 2013.  However, Phase 1 and Phase 2 above 
can be executed in parallel with no disruption to the ERP project.  This schedule will 
allow Regency thorough time for Phase 2 (Franchise Feasibility) so as to understand and 
experiment with differing concepts at the retail level with direct contact to customer 
information.   Regency will also have the ability to test new product designs and concepts 
away from the MC dealer and in a controlled Regency exclusive environment. 
Regency’s preference to change management, as mentioned in this analysis, is not 
one of sudden change but rather incremental through a series of learning steps and 
adjustments.  Strategic Alternative #2, The Regency Franchise, is recommended to be 
implemented in the same fashion.  However, once human resources, structure and 
systems are in place and a franchise concept and formula have been proven, Regency will 
be in a position to replicate and roll out their franchise model to North America. 
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